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I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Competition policy boosting innovation and investment across the EU 
The EU remains the largest economic and trading area in the world, with more than half a 
billion consumers and 20 million companies forming its strongest lever – the internal market. 
The on-going process of improving and expanding the functioning of the single market goes 
hand in hand with developing competition policy. In essence, competition policy ensures that 
companies can compete on equal terms all across Europe.  
Competition can make a real difference by keeping the single market open and turning it into 
a driver of innovation and growth in Europe. Competition policy enables competitors to 
cooperate on innovation without misusing such cooperation to anti-competitive ends. In this 
way it ensures that mergers do not reduce or harm innovation and it enables EU governments 
to contribute to private-sector investments in innovation. In addition, competition-friendly 
regulation and competition culture create favourable conditions for investments and 
innovation, which enhances consumer welfare and efficiently functioning markets, enable 
growth and contribute towards more convergence. A competitive EU internal market also 
prepares European companies to succeed on global markets. 
State aid 
 
State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective 
competition and free trade in the single market. 
The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States (Article 107(1) TFEU). However, State aid, which contributes 
to well-defined objectives of common interest without unduly distorting competition between undertakings and 
trade between Member States, may be considered compatible with the internal market (under Article 107(3) 
TFEU).  
The objectives of the Commission's control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and 
effective, and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints and where aid is granted; it does not restrict 
competition but addresses market failures to the benefit of society as a whole. In addition to this, the 
Commission is actively engaged in preventing and recovering incompatible State aid. 
1. State Aid Modernisation: Implementation phase 
In 2014 the Commission largely completed its ambitious State Aid Modernisation (SAM) 
reform.
1
 The reform, which was launched in 2012,
2
 aimed at promoting good aid that supports 
investments and spurs growth while contributing to Member States' efforts towards budgetary 
consolidation. In 2015, work continued on the remaining item of the reform, namely the 
guidance on the notion of aid.  
SAM provides for more efficient decision-making and procedures for granting growth-
supporting aid that is not distortive to market functioning in the EU. Among the key 
objectives of the reform are: tangible cuts in red tape, the promotion of a better use of limited 
public resources by Member States and of a higher contribution of aid measures to investment 
                                                          
1
 For a comprehensive overview of State Aid Modernisation see DG Competition webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html  
2
 Communication of 8 May 2012 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), 
COM(2012) 209 final. 
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and growth. For instance, the new State aid rules under the research, development and 
innovation (R&D&I) framework encourage and contribute the spread of innovation in the EU 
for the benefit of businesses and consumers. 
One of the cornerstones of the State Aid Modernisation reform was the new General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)
3
, which simplifies aid granting procedures for Member States 
by authorising without prior notification a wide range of measures fulfilling horizontal 
common interest objectives. Only cases with the biggest potential to distort competition in the 
single market will still face ex ante assessment (notification). As a result of the reform, a 
significantly larger number of smaller and unproblematic measures are exempted from prior 
notification, in exchange for strengthened controls at Member State level, greater 
transparency and better evaluation of the impact of aid. 
 
Following the State Aid modernisation and the entry into force of the new GBER, Member 
States made extensive use of the possibilities offered by the comprehensive modernisation of 
State aid rules. Notably, a surge in aid excluded from prior Commission scrutiny indicates an 
important reduction of red tape. Indeed, the above chart highlights the fact that about 90 % of 
new measures in 2014 were registered as exempted from prior notification according to 
GBER. As regards the share of GBER expenditure in total aid measures, this amounted to 
approximately 40 % in 2014, and is expected to increase even further in 2015. 
Partnership with Member States 
To facilitate the implementation of SAM, the Commission is supporting Member States in 
various ways and has started a closer cooperation with them. Under the new partnership 
arrangements with Member States, the Commission provides pro-active support of Member 
                                                          
3
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 
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States by the Commission through advocacy work and trainings. The Commission services 
have also set up a High Level Group (HLG) together with Member States and some other 
dedicated working groups to oversee implementation and facilitate compliance with the new 
requirements for transparency and evaluations. To facilitate the work of the central authorities 
in Member States, the Commission services have in place a network of State aid country 
coordinators. The coordinators help to address systemic issues in State aid enforcement at 
Member State level, help Member States prioritise their portfolio of cases and assist with 
providing training and guidance. The Commission services have also provided further 
guidance on the interpretation of the GBER
4
. 
Collaboration with Member States takes multiple forms. One fruitful form of the multilateral 
partnership is the project between the Commission services and the Member States to 
facilitate compliance with the new transparency provisions of SAM. All Member States have 
committed to participating in the development of the Transparency Award Module – an IT 
platform that will facilitate data collection, storage and visualisation. Meanwhile, the 
discussions with Member States are ongoing about the institutional set up of granting 
authorities, national information systems for State aid, and methodology used for encoding 
information required by the transparency provisions of GBER (Article 9 and Annex III).  
Evaluation 
Evaluation of aid schemes is a new requirement introduced by SAM. The aim is to gather the 
necessary evidence to better identify impact, improve enforcement and inform future policy-
making by Member States and the Commission.  
Evaluation also complements the major expansion of the GBER and represents a necessary ex 
post safeguard, alongside transparency and monitoring, to promote quality and effectiveness 
of aid policies. Since 1 July 2014, evaluation is required for large GBER schemes in certain 
aid categories
5
 as well as for some schemes notified under the new generation of State aid 
guidelines
6
. 
By the end of 2015, the Commission had approved evaluation plans covering 17 large State 
aid schemes submitted by 10 Member States
7
; most of these decisions concerned either 
regional or R&D&I aid schemes. These schemes account in total for about EUR 10 billion of 
the annual State aid budget. 
General State aid scrutiny supporting innovation and growth 
More flexible rules following the finalisation of SAM made it easier in 2015 for Member 
States to implement R&D&I projects, risk finance schemes and other aid measures, as well as 
enabled the Commission to focus on projects with an important impact on competition. 
                                                          
4
 General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) Frequently Asked Questions of July 2015, prepared by the 
Commission services available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/practical_guide_gber_en.pdf  
5 
Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for 
SMEs and access to finance, aid for research and development and innovation, energy and environmental aid and 
aid for broadband infrastructures.  
6 
Evaluation might apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when 
significant market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen.  
7
 Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland, and United Kingdom. 
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Aid for research, development and innovation 
One of the headline targets of Europe 2020 Strategy
8
 is for R&D&I investments in the EU to 
reach 3 % of GDP. However, R&D spending in Europe has been lagging behind major global 
competitors, now standing a touch above 2 % of GDP, compared with around 3 % in the 
United States of America and Japan. This is mainly the result of lower levels of private 
investment.  
The State aid rules for R&D&I aim to ensure that public funding goes to research projects that 
would not have happened otherwise, i.e. projects that truly go beyond the state of the art and 
which bring innovative products and services to the market and ultimately to consumers.  
The new State aid rules, which entered into force on 1 July 2014 aim at market efficiency and 
mobilising private investment in projects that would have not been implemented due to 
market failures. The rules also set the ground for EU companies to combine their efforts with 
Member States and invest further in R&D&I as a gateway for sustainable growth and job 
creation in Europe. The enlarged scope of the rules, as well as more flexible and simpler 
criteria under which the State aid is more likely to be found compatible with the internal 
market, facilitate the implementation of R&D projects by Member States. 
Aid measures enabling ground-breaking research 
In 2015, using the new rules the Commission approved ambitious projects in areas such as satellite launchers 
(i.e. access to space), electricity transportation and aeronautics. For instance, the SABRE project (United 
Kingdom) can lead to significant technological advances that would benefit consumers using products and 
services that depend on low Earth orbiting satellites, such as mobile communications and other services. 
Similarly the Supergrid project (France) has put in place a framework for collaboration between academia and 
industry over innovation in the field of technology for long-distance electricity transportation. Finally, the TS 
3000 project (France) will encourage research in the field of aeronautics while putting in place higher standards 
for performance, environment and new materials. Nonetheless, the Commission has remained vigilant and 
decided to investigate further the impact on competition of a project establishing a test facility in the railway 
industry in Spain. 
According to the information submitted by the Member States to the Commission in 2015, the Member States 
implemented 603 R&D&I schemes covered by the new GBER (Articles 25 to 30), with an estimated annual 
expenditure of EUR 18.8 billion. Finally, in 2015 the Commission also approved eight evaluation plans covering 
research and development measures with an overall annual budget in excess of EUR 150 million. 
Aid to risk finance  
In addition to the new R&D&I State aid rules, the Commission has put in place a simpler, 
more flexible and generous State aid framework for risk finance for SMEs and mid-caps. The 
new rules, contained in the new Risk Finance Guidelines and in the new GBER, entered into 
force on 1 July 2014.
9
 
SMEs across the EU remain heavily dependent on traditional bank lending, which is still 
limited by banks' refinancing capacity, risk appetite and capital adequacy. The financial crisis 
has exacerbated the problem with approximately one third of SMEs being unable to receive 
the necessary finance in recent years. Given the pivotal importance of SMEs and midcaps for 
the whole EU economy, the situation has a significant negative impact on growth and job 
                                                          
8
 Communication of 3 March 2010 from the Commission, Europe 2020 A Strategy For Smart, Sustainable And 
Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 
1427303331326&uri=CELEX:52010DC2020  
9
 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments, OJ C 19, 
22.1.2014, p. 4 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0122(04)  
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creation. The new rules aim to offer better incentives for private sector investors - including 
institutional ones – to increase their funding activities in the critical area of SME and midcaps 
financing. The rules also mirror other EU initiatives designed to promote wider use of 
financial instruments in the context of new support programmes such as Horizon 2020 or 
COSME (the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprise and SMEs)
10
.  
The new risk finance regime provides the framework for seamless support for new ventures 
from their creation to their development into global players. The aim is to help new ventures 
to get past the critical stages, namely the “valley of death”, where private financing is either 
unavailable or not available in the necessary amount or form.  
Aid measures encouraging investment and innovation 
In 2015, under the new Risk Finance Guidelines, the Commission adopted several decisions on schemes aimed 
at encouraging investment in innovative SMEs and midcaps. It approved one scheme in the United Kingdom 
(the EIS-VCT scheme, targeting innovative SMEs and midcaps) and two schemes in France (Amortissement 
exceptionnel des investissements des entreprises dans les PME innovantes and ISF-PME schemes). Taking the 
view that these measures covered a real gap in the market, the Commission worked together with the Member 
States on solutions to limit the impact on competition in the single market. The Commission considered that the 
risks inherent to the activities of these young firms and innovative companies (i.e. products/technologies not yet 
proven to be economically viable) and the lack of financial guarantees limited their capacity to access funding. 
In addition, their small size meant that they were not in a position to employ staff specifically dedicated to 
financial management. The in-depth analysis was performed on the basis of substantiated economic ex-ante 
assessment provided by the Member States to demonstrate the market failure affecting these specific categories 
of companies. The assessment showed that there are still specific funding needs for certain innovative SMEs 
beyond the criteria set out in the GBER (i.e. wider range of financial instruments, risk finance measure of up to 
EUR 15 million, possibility of capital replacement, tailored private participation ratio). The examination showed 
the existence of a funding gap for certain innovative SMEs and that the aid was necessary to stimulate 
investment that would not have been provided by the market unprompted. 
According to the information submitted by the Member States to the Commission, the Member States, 
implemented 161 measures, under Articles 21 to 24 of the new GBER to help SMEs to access finance. The 
measures had an estimated annual budget of EUR 7.015 million. Finally, in 2015 the Commission also approved 
four evaluation plans covering risk finance measures with an overall annual budget in excess of EUR 150 
million.  
Regional aid  
Regional aid is an important instrument in the EU's toolbox to promote greater economic and 
social cohesion. The 2014-2020 regional aid framework has been fully in place since July 
2014, following the adoption in June 2013 of the revised Regional Aid Guidelines for the 
period between July 2014 and 31 December 2020 (RAG 2014-20), the adoption of the 
regional aid provisions in the GBER and the approval of the 28 regional aid maps in 2014.  
The new GBER has extended the range of regional aid measures, enabling Member States to 
put in place aid schemes and individual aid measures without having to notify them to the 
Commission. Examples of these are ad hoc regional investment aid measures below the 
notification thresholds, transport aid schemes and operating aid schemes for outermost 
regions. In 2015 the Commission advised Member States' authorities on how to interpret and 
implement the new regional aid provisions of GBER, thus helping them to make a success of 
the reforms introduced under SAM. Since its adoption in June 2014, the Commission services 
have answered some 120 sets of questions on how to interpret the regional aid provisions in 
                                                          
10
 For an overview on the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/cosme/index_en.htm  
 9 
GBER, and have provided guidance on how to implement of GBER measures as part of 
numerous pre-notification contacts. 
Regional aid measures  
In 2015, the Commission adopted several decisions on regional aid measures under the new provisions, e.g. on 
investment aid schemes
11
, operating aid schemes in the outermost regions
12
, and on evaluation plans for 
exempted large regional aid schemes
13
.
 
The Commission also adopted several decisions on regional aid measures 
to support large investment projects under the preceding rules: in particular, it took a final decision authorising 
regional aid for investments by Volkswagen in Portugal (cars) and approved aid for Nexen in the Czech 
Republic (tyre production), for Nitrogénművek in Hungary and for Duslo in Slovakia (both in the fertiliser 
sector). 
European Fund for Strategic Investments 
In November 2014, President Juncker announced the creation of the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (EFSI), with the objective to generate EUR 315 billion in investment in 
Europe. The Regulation setting up the EFSI was adopted in July 2015. In that context the 
Commission has put in place an accelerated procedure for approving within six weeks 
Member State co-financing constituting notifiable State aid. This process should contribute to 
the necessary public and private financing to reach concrete infrastructure and innovation 
projects as quickly as possible. 
2. State Aid Modernisation continues 
Notion of aid / effect on trade 
One building block of SAM still needs to be put in place, namely a Commission guidance 
document on the notion of State aid in the light of important changes in case law and 
enforcement practice. 
Given the high level of economic integration achieved within the EU, aid that distorts 
competition between companies will in most cases also have an impact on intra-EU trade. 
However, if State support is granted to an activity which has a purely local impact, there may 
not be an effect on intra-EU trade, e.g. where the beneficiary supplies goods or services to a 
limited area within a Member State and is unlikely to attract customers from other Member 
States. Moreover, the measure should have no - or at most marginal – foreseeable effects on 
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 Case SA.39869 Corporate tax exemption scheme (BG), Commission decision of 14 September 2015 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39869 
12 
Cases SA.38536 Aide fiscale à l’investissement outre-mer, Commission decision of 2 March 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38536 and SA.38823 Reduced 
rate of excise duty applied to rum and liqueurs produced and consumed in Madeira (2014-2020), Commission 
decision of 2 March 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38823 
13 
Cases SA.39460 Evaluation plan for the block exempted large aid scheme "Bund-Länder-
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur - Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" (DE), 
Commission decision of 22 July 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39460; SA.39669 Evaluation 
plan of the Development Tax Benefit Scheme (HU), Commission decision of 16 January 2015 available at, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39669; SA.38830 Evaluation 
plan Polish SEZ scheme (PL), Commission decision of 16 June 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38830 and SA.42136 
Evaluation Plan: Inovação Empresarial (PT), Commission decision of 19 August 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42136 
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cross-border investments in the sector or the establishment of firms within the EU's internal 
market. 
In this context, the European Commission has concluded on 29 April that seven measures 
granting public support to purely local operations did not involve State aid within the meaning 
of the EU rules, since they were unlikely to have a significant effect on trade between 
Member States. The decisions concerned the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom
14
. 
These decisions provide Member States and stakeholders with additional guidance to 
determine which cases do not need to be cleared by the Commission under EU State aid rules. 
They complement the Commission's revised GBER.  
To provide further guidance to Member States, the Commission services have updated the 
analytical grids on the financing of infrastructure projects
15
. The grids explain when, in view 
of the Commission services, no State aid is involved and when notification for State aid 
clearance is needed. They also explain the framework for services of general economic 
interest. 
The analytical grids explain the current rules and the Commission's decisional practice on the 
application of State aid rules to the public financing of infrastructure projects. The grids were 
updated following the State aid modernisation. The previous grids dated from 2012 and 
followed the Leipzig-Halle
16
 judgment. 
Further extension of the scope of the GBER 
Recital 1 of the GBER already announced that the Commission planned to propose criteria for 
exempting port and airport infrastructure provided that sufficient case experience was 
developed. The first public consultations will take place early 2016. 
3. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 
Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure a level playing field 
Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved. Today, 32 % of aid is granted 
under block-exempted schemes which are not examined by the Commission before entering 
into force
17
. Overall, 88 % of aid is granted on the basis of previously approved aid schemes 
                                                          
14
 Cases SA.37432 Hradec Králové public hospitals (CZ), Commission decisions of 29 April 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37432; SA.37904 Medical 
centre in Durmersheim (DE) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37904; SA.33149 Städtische 
Projektgesellschaft "Wirtschaftsbüro Gaarden - Kiel" (DE) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_33149; SA.38035 Landgrafen-
Klinik (DE); SA.39403 Investment aid for Lauwersoog port (NL) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38035; SA.37963 Glenmore 
Lodge (UK), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37963 
and SA.38208 Member-owned golf clubs (UK) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38208   
15
 For further information see analytical grids on the financing of infrastructure projects available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/state_aid_grids_2015_en.pdf  
16
 Joined cases T-443/08 and T-455/08 Freistaat Sachsen, Flughafen Leipzig/Halle et al v Commission, 
judgment of the General Court of 24 March 2011 [2011] ECR II-1311. 
17
 This percentage concerns aid in terms of volume. Banking schemes are not considered here. See latest publicly 
available figures (2012), Scoreboard, EU 27 (2006-2012) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/graph8.jpg  
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or Block Exemption Regulations
18
. In that context, it is essential for the Commission to verify 
that Member States apply the schemes correctly and that they only grant aid when all required 
conditions are met.  
To that end, the Commission introduced in 2006 a regular, ex post, sample-based control of 
existing aid schemes ("monitoring"). After a modest start covering about 20 schemes and 10 
Member States in each monitoring cycle, the Commission has considerably stepped up 
monitoring since 2011. Building on the Court of Auditors recommendations
19
 and anticipating 
future changes in how State aid is controlled, the Commission has substantially increased the 
size of the monitoring sample in the last three annual cycles to 96 schemes in the current 2015 
review. It also extended the scope of its control.  
The 2015 cycle covered all Member States, all main types of aid approved as well as block-
exempted schemes. Furthermore, the sample contained a number of block-exempted schemes 
under the new GBER
20
. Also, the Commission carried out two pilot projects on targeted 
monitoring. First, the Commission assessed aid schemes in one particular Member State
21
 in 
order to examine whether accumulation rules were correctly observed when aid for the same 
project was granted under different schemes. Second, the Commission monitored a number of 
large investments projects in order to assess whether they had been correctly implemented. 
The Commission follows up systematically on all irregularities and uses the means at its 
disposal, as appropriate, to address the competition distortions that these may have caused. In 
some cases, Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to 
amend national legislation or to recover the excess aid granted. In other cases, the 
Commission may need to take formal action. In 2015, the Commission adopted two final 
decisions in cases where it had opened a formal investigation procedure in 2013. In those 
cases, the Member States provided additional information that removed the Commission's 
concerns that the schemes had been misapplied
22
. It also adopted one final decision, after the 
Member State concerned, France, committed itself to making an incompatible aid scheme 
compatible with the State aid rules
23
.  
Restoring competition through recovery of State aid granted in breach of the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the single market, the Commission has the power and the duty to 
request that Member States recover unlawful and incompatible aid which has unduly distorted 
competition and trade between Member States. In 2015, further progress was made to ensure 
that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately. 
                                                          
18
 See previous footnote. 
19 
In its 2011 report on the efficiency of State aid procedures, the Court of Auditors considered that, in view of 
the importance of aids granted under existing aid schemes, the Commission's monitoring activity should be 
reinforced. See the recommendation n° 1 of the Court of Auditors Report recital 96, p. 41, publicly available at 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/10952771.PDF 
20
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 
21
 United Kingdom. 
22
 Cases SA.15373 Enterprise Capital Funds, Commission decision of 9 March 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_15373 and SA.20326 Mesures 
de dispense partielle de précompte professionnel en faveur de la R&D, Commission decision of 23 January 2015 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_20326 
23
 Case SA.14551 Taxation au tonnage, Commission decision of 4 February 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_14551 For further information 
see IP/15/4105 of 4 February 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4105_en.htm  
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By 31 December, the amount of illegal and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries had 
increased to EUR 13.5 billion
24
, from EUR 8.5 billion in December 2004
25
. This means that 
the percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered fell slightly from 74 % at 
the end of 2004 to around 55 % at the end of 2015.  
In 2015, the Commission adopted 17 new recovery decisions and EUR 6.1 million was 
recovered by the Member States. As of the end of December, the Commission had 54 pending 
recovery cases.  
Recovery decisions adopted in 2015 17 
Amount recovered in 2015 (EUR million) 6.1 
Pending recovery cases on 31 December 2015 54 
As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including launching infringement 
procedures. In 2015, the Court of Justice condemned two Member States under Article 108(2) 
TFEU
26
 (France and Germany)
27
 and one Member State under Article 260(2) TFEU (Italy)
28
.  
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules  
The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts under the Commission Notice 
on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts of 2009
29
 (the "Enforcement Notice"). 
This cooperation includes direct case-related assistance to national courts when they apply EU 
State aid law. The courts can ask the Commission to provide case related information, or to 
provide an opinion on the application of the competition rules. The Commission may also 
submit amicus curiae observations at its own initiative.  
In 2015, the Commission responded to two requests for information and two requests for an 
opinion under Article 29 of the Procedural Regulation
30
. The requests for information were 
issued by a Spanish and a German court. They concerned the state of the proceedings before 
the Commission of a complaint and the transmission of documents in the possession of the 
Commission as well as questions on how to interpret the notion of State aid. The requests for 
an opinion came from two German courts: one related to the aid element in a bank guarantee 
and the other to the existence of alleged State aid.  
The Commission received also questions from third parties bringing cases to the attention of 
the Commission and asking the Commission to submit observations as amicus curiae. 
However, under the Procedural Regulation, the Commission has the duty to reply only to 
requests made by national courts, not to requests made by third parties. This provision is 
intended to preserve the independence of the national courts, even though requests made by 
                                                          
24
 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2015. 
25
 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. 
26
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p.47. 
27 Cases C-63/14 Commission v France, judgment of the Court of 9 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:458 and C-
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 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1. 
30
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third parties can be a useful tool to inform the Commission about ongoing cases where the 
submission of observations ex officio can be presented. 
As a result of the 2013 amendment to the Procedural Regulation, the Commission has the 
possibility to submit amicus curiae observations on its own initiative before national courts. 
Article 29 of the Procedural Regulation mirrors in that respect Article 15 (3) of Regulation 
1/2003 in the field of antitrust. In 2015, the Commission submitted observations before a 
French court on questions related to the execution of recovery decisions and observations 
were submitted to various courts in Romania, a court in Belgium and in the United States 
concerning the recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award, the implementation of 
which the Commission deems to constitute the grant of State aid. Further observations 
regarding the recognition and enforcement of that award will be submitted, in France, the 
United Kingdom and Luxembourg, but these were not yet filed in 2015. 
The Commission intends to publish its opinions and amicus curiae observations on its website 
as soon as it receives approval from the courts concerned
31
.  
The Commission also continued its advocacy efforts. In 2015, the Commission was actively 
involved in evaluating the financing of training programmes for national judges and in 
assessing judges' needs. It also sent officials to teach at such workshops and conferences
32
. 
4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in the State aid area 
In 2015, the EU Courts adopted a number of important judgments in the State aid area in 
particular on the concept of State resources, advantage and selectivity. The following 
overview is based on a selection of Court judgments. 
State resources and effect on trade 
By judgment of 14 January in 
 
Eventech,
33
 the Court of Justice rendered a preliminary ruling 
in response to a reference by the Court of Appeal of England & Wales by which it concluded 
that the policy by which London taxis (black cabs) were allowed to drive in publicly funded 
bus lanes, but minicabs were excluded, did not give rise to State aid. The Court of Justice 
ruled, first, that the policy did not involve State resources because, black cab's use of those 
lanes being permitted by law, their "exemption" from fines did not involve additional burdens 
on the public authorities which could entail a commitment of such resources.  
The Court of Justice ruled, next, that since roads and bus lanes are not operated commercially 
by the public authorities the policy does not entail forgoing revenues they would have 
otherwise received in the absence of that policy. The Court of Justice further elaborated that 
where the State grants a right of privileged access to public infrastructure that is not operated 
commercially by the public authorities to users of that infrastructure in order to pursue the 
realisation of an objective laid down by that State’s legislation, the State does not necessarily 
confer an economic advantage on those users. On selectivity, the Court of Justice ruled that 
black cabs and minicabs were not in a comparable factual or legal situation on the basis of 
physical and licensing characteristics, so that the permission of one and the exclusion of the 
latter from the bus policy did not constitute State aid. Finally, the Court of Justice upheld the 
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 Commission notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 22, paragraph 
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32
 See also the dedicated section Cooperation with national courts, Antitrust and Cartels Section, item 7. 
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Altmark case law on the effect on trade between Member States, although invited by the 
Advocate General and the ESA to revisit that case law, by concluding that it was feasible that 
the policy was liable to affect such trade since it could render less attractive the provision of 
minicab services in London. 
The concept of advantage and quantification 
As regards the concept of advantage, the Court of Justice ruled in OTP Bank Nyrt
34
 on the 
basis of another reference for a preliminary ruling that a Hungarian aid scheme to facilitate 
access to housing via banks provided an advantage to credit institutions established in 
Hungary. This enabled the banks to conclude loan agreements without having to assume the 
financial risk. The Court of Justice also ruled that in addition to the fact that the scheme 
enabled banks to conclude loans, it allowed them to provide additional services against 
remuneration, such as the opening of a current account. Such advantage was also selective as 
it concerned the economic sector of credit establishments (to the exclusion of other economic 
sectors). 
Also as regards the concept of advantage and in particular the issue of quantification of 
advantage, the General Court handed down two judgments (Aer Lingus v Commission
35
, 
Ryanair v Commission
36
) on a Commission decision declaring the application by Ireland of 
differentiated air travel tax rates as illegal State aid. The General Court confirmed the 
assessment of the Commission that had found the higher rate of EUR10 per passenger as the 
normal tax rate and the lower tax rate of EUR 2 per passenger travelling to destinations 
located at maximum 300 km from Dublin the exception from the normal rate, constituting 
State aid to certain airlines. However, the General Court found that the Commission was 
wrong in quantifying the economic advantage as the difference between the two rates, since it 
should have taken into account the degree to which the airlines could have fully or partially 
passed on the advantage to the passengers. Thus, the advantage actually obtained by the 
airlines did not necessarily consist in the difference between the two rates, but rather in the 
possibility of offering more attractive prices and thereby increasing the turnover. Recovery 
should therefore also be limited to what was actually withheld by the airlines. 
Market economy investor principle 
As regards the application of the market economy investor principle, the General Court ruled 
in a judgment of 2 July in joined cases France and Orange (former France Télécom) v 
Commission
37
, following a referral from the Court of Justice that the Commission was wrong 
to consider that the offer of a loan made to Orange was a State aid and thereby annulled the 
Commission decision. The General Court held that the relevant moment at which the 
Commission must apply the "Market Economy Investor Principle" (MEIP) is when the State 
financial support measure that may be characterised as State aid is adopted (i.e. December 
2002) and not to the situation as it existed before July 2002 when the French Minister publicly 
stated that the French State would take the appropriate measures to rescue France Télécom.  
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While the General Court accepted that it is possible to take account of prior events and 
objective facts, it did not consider that those earlier events and facts alone can conclusively 
form the relevant reference framework for the purposes of applying the MEIP. As for the July 
2002 ministerial statement, the General Court noted that the Commission did not succeed in 
proving that the intention of the French authorities was sufficiently genuine, reliable, specific 
and unconditional for them to be legally bound by such statements. 
The concept of selectivity 
On the concept of selectivity, the Court of Justice in Commission v MOL Nyrt
38
 upheld the 
judgment of the General Court that had annulled a Commission decision concerning State aid 
granted to the oil and gas company MOL. The Commission had considered that the agreement 
between the Hungarian government and MOL which provided for a prolongation of the 
mining authorisation and a 2008 amendment to the Mining Act constituted a selective aid 
measure. This prolongation significantly increased the mining fees for all mining companies 
except for those which had already signed a prolongation agreement, i.e. in practice only 
MOL.  
With reference to the 2005 agreement between the Hungarian government and MOL, the 
Court of Justice concluded that, firstly, the selectivity requirement differs depending on 
whether the measure in question constitutes a scheme or individual aid. In the case of 
individual aid, the identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to 
support the presumption that it is selective. In the case of a scheme, it is necessary to identify 
whether the measure in question, notwithstanding the fact that it confers an advantage, does 
so to the exclusive benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity. 
Secondly, there is a fundamental difference between the assessment of the selectivity of 
general schemes for exemption or relief, which, by definition, confer an advantage, and the 
assessment of the selectivity of optional provisions of national law prescribing the imposition 
of additional charges. In cases in which the national authorities impose additional charges in 
order to maintain equal treatment between operators, the simple fact that those authorities 
enjoy discretion defined by law, and not unlimited discretion, cannot be sufficient to establish 
that the corresponding scheme is selective. As regards both the 2005 agreement and the 2008 
amendment taken together, the Court of Justice concluded that there was no chronological 
and/or functional link between the 2005 agreement and the 2008 amendment and could 
therefore not be considered as a single aid measure. 
The concept of Services of General Economic Interest 
The EU Courts also handed down two important judgments on the concept of Services of 
General Economic Interest (SGEI). In TV2/Denmark v Commission
39
 and Viasat v 
Commission
40
, the General Court confirmed the Commission's assessment that the Altmark
41
 
conditions were not fulfilled with respect to the financing of the Danish public broadcaster but 
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disagreed with the Commission that the second Altmark condition requires the beneficiary of 
the SGEI compensation to be operating efficiently.  
According to the General Court, this would lead to confusion between the second and the 
fourth Altmark conditions. In addition, the notion of a typical well-run company as stated in 
the fourth Altmark condition requires the beneficiary of the compensation to be compared 
with another company which is not a beneficiary. It is not sufficient for that purpose to argue 
that there is no comparable company because of the specific public service task entrusted to 
the beneficiary and on that basis argue that the beneficiary itself constitutes such a typical 
well-run company. Finally, as regards the question whether advertising revenue generated by 
commercials broadcast by TV2 but channelled to a fund and consequently disbursed back to 
TV2 constitute State resources, the General Court held that the State's intervention was 
limited to the fixing of amounts to be channelled to TV2. Thus, the State could only decide 
that TV2 would not receive all of the funds, but only a certain part of it, which is not 
sufficient to find that they constitute State resources. The funds keep their character as income 
generated by commercial activities of TV2. 
Social housing constitute an existing aid scheme 
Finally, in an order of 12 May in RENV Stichting Woonlinie v Commission
42
, the General 
Court confirmed the Commission's decision of 15 December 2009 which found the Dutch 
social housing scheme to constitute an existing aid scheme compatible with the EU State aid 
rules on SGEI further to commitments by the Netherlands. The General Court gave its 
decision by reasoned order which is available only in cases where the action is manifestly 
lacking any foundation in law (or manifestly inadmissible). The General Court rejected all the 
arguments put forward that were mainly directed against the changes in the Dutch social 
housing scheme, in particular an income limit in order to benefit from social housing. 
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Antitrust and cartels 
 
Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU  
According to Article 101 TFEU, anti-competitive agreements are prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object or effects where companies 
coordinate their behaviour instead of competing independently. Even if a horizontal or a vertical agreement 
could be viewed as restrictive (for example by combining the production of two competing companies) it might 
be allowed under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters competition (for example by promoting technical 
progress or by improving distribution).  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a 
dominant position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, the same as any other undertaking in 
the market, are entitled to compete on the merits. However, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive behaviour of 
such dominant undertakings which prevents new entry or squeezes competitors out of the market. These 
practices hamper competition and negatively affect incentives to innovation and growth, as well as consumer 
welfare.  
Finally, Article 106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force any measures contrary 
to the Treaty rules regarding public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights (privileged undertakings). 
1. Guidance in antitrust and cartel proceedings 
In 2015, in order to further increase transparency and to offer guidance to parties and 
practitioners the Commission published a number of guidance documents on its procedures: 
Based on the experience gained in the past years, the purpose of the Best Practices on the 
disclosure of information in data rooms
43
 in proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
and under the EU Merger Regulation is to provide practical guidance on when and how to use 
data rooms to disclose in a restricted manner business secrets and other confidential 
information obtained during antitrust and merger proceedings. 
Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission Decisions
44
 was also adopted 
under Articles 7 to 10, 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003. It sets out how the Commission 
prepares the public version of antitrust decisions. It describes (i) what information 
undertakings can claim should be redacted and how they should substantiate their claims; (ii) 
what the Commission redacts on its own initiative and (iii) the procedure that is followed to 
settle confidentiality claims. 
The guidance paper titled Recommendations for the Use of Electronic Document Submissions 
in Antitrust and Cartel Case Proceedings
45
 contains guidance in particular on how to submit 
documents electronically to the Commission (either by e-mail, via eTrustEx or by e-
questionnaire), their format and size, protection, encryption, naming, languages, and non-
confidential versions. 
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2. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in antitrust and cartels 
Article 101 TFEU 
Communications between competitors, single and continuous infringement 
In the Dole judgment46, pertaining to the bananas cartel, the Court of Justice entirely 
dismissed the appeal brought by banana importer Dole against the General Court judgment. 
The Court of Justice confirmed that communications between competitors leading to 
horizontal price-fixing are anti-competitive by their very object and amount to a violation of 
EU antitrust rules, without requiring an analysis of their effect on competition in the market. 
The Court of Justice agreed with the Commission that the cartelists' communications before 
setting the quotation prices for bananas reduced uncertainty for each of the participants as to 
the conduct of their competitors. This had the objective of creating competitive conditions 
that did not correspond to the normal conditions on the market without such collusive contacts 
and therefore gave rise to a concerted practice between the companies with the object to 
restrict competition. 
In the Del Monte judgment47
,
 also pertaining to the bananas cartel, the Court of Justice 
dismissed the appeal brought by Del Monte against the General Court judgment and accepted 
the appeal of the Commission brought against the same judgment. The judgment of the Court 
of Justice gives an important precedent clarifying aspects of the case law concerning the 
concept of a single continuous infringement. The Court of Justice confirmed that parties' 
unawareness of certain elements of a cartel does not alter the finding of a single and 
continuous infringement. The Court of Justice upheld the Commission's appeal against the 
fine reduction for cooperation awarded by the General Court and found that a reply to a 
simple request for information is not sufficient for a fine reduction. 
Liability of facilitator 
In AC-Treuhand judgment48 the Court of Justice confirmed the General Court's judgment and 
thus, the Commission's decision to hold AC-Treuhand liable as a cartel facilitator under 
Article 101 TFEU. In its decision, the Commission fined AC-Treuhand because it played an 
essential role in the two infringements (ESBO/esters - Heat Stabilisers). It organised a number 
of meetings at its Zürich premises in which it actively participated, collecting from and 
supplying to the producers of heat stabilisers data on sales on the relevant markets, offering to 
act as a moderator in the event of tensions between those producers and encouraging the latter 
to find compromises, for which it received remuneration.  
In the judgment the Court of Justice interpreted Article 101 TFEU as referring to all 
agreements and concerted practices which distort competition, irrespective of the markets the 
parties operate on. The Court of Justice held that to be held liable for an infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU, it is not required to restrict one's freedom of action on a particular market 
and that the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be endangered if undertakings such as 
AC-Treuhand were allowed to escape liability simply because they do not contribute actively 
to the restriction of competition in a particular market. On fines, the Court of Justice agreed 
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that the Commission was entitled to deviate from the usual calculation method and to impose 
a lump sum on AC-Treuhand. 
Parental liability, fines calculation 
On 9 September, the General Court handed down five judgments
49
 in the TV and Computer 
monitor tubes cartel involving seven undertakings which participated in either one or both of 
two distinct cartels in the cathode ray tubes sector. The General Court found that the 
Commission had jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the cartels were formed outside the 
EEA. The cartel arrangements directly influenced the setting of prices and of volumes 
delivered to the EEA either as direct sales or as products processed by vertically integrated 
companies.  
On substance, the General Court upheld the majority of the Commission's findings with the 
exception of the individual participation of Toshiba in the early period of the cartel, for which 
the General Court found that that Commission had not sufficiently established its awareness 
of the overall cartel.  
The judgments also upheld the Commission's decision regarding parental liability. In 
particular, the General Court confirmed, in line with established case law, that parent 
companies were liable for the illegal anti-competitive behaviour of joint ventures irrespective 
of the ownership shares (regarding both the Philips/LG Electronics and the Toshiba/Panasonic 
joint ventures).  
The General Court also upheld the fines methodology and confirmed by reference to the 
Innolux judgment
50
 of the Court of Justice the Commission's right to consider sales of 
finished products sold to third parties in the European Economic Area (EEA) in which a 
vertically integrated cartelist had incorporated cathode ray tubes into its finished products 
outside the EEA. Finally, the General Court decided to reduce the fines for Panasonic, 
Toshiba and MTPD as it had found that the companies provided a more detailed value of sales 
figures than what the Commission had used. The fine, however, set at just over EUR 1.4 
billion, remains the highest ever total fines imposed in a cartel case. 
Calculation of fines 
In its LG judgment
51
 of 23 April, the Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the General 
Court concerning the LCD panels cartel
52
. The main issue at stake was whether sales to 
parents of a joint venture could be taken into account in the calculation of fines. The Court of 
Justice held that the Commission was entitled to take into account such sales. This was 
because even if these sales were made at a preferential price (and might therefore not be 
influenced by the cartel), they were made on the market affected by the infringement and 
should be included to correctly reflect the importance of the parties on that market. The Court 
of Justice further held that these sales must be regarded a sales made to independent third 
parties (external sales) since the joint venture and its parent companies did not constitute a 
single undertaking. 
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In another judgment
53
 in the LCD panels case adopted on 9 July, the Court of Justice upheld 
the fine imposed on another cartelist (Innolux). The main issue at stake was whether the intra-
group sales of cartelised products (LCD panels) outside the EEA which were incorporated 
into the finished products (TVs) within the group to which the producer belongs and then sold 
in the EEA can be taken into account when calculating the fine (direct sales through 
transformed products). The Court of Justice concluded that when the goods concerned by the 
cartel were incorporated into finished products by a vertically integrated undertaking outside 
the EEA, the Commission may take into account, for the purposes of calculating the fine to be 
imposed on that undertaking and up to the value of the incorporated panels, the sales of its 
finished products in the EEA to independent third-party undertakings.  
Single and continuous infringement, agent as economic unit 
In 10 judgments handed down on 15 July
54
, the General Court dismissed nearly all actions 
brought against the Commission's Pre-stressing Steel cartel decision of 30 June 2010
55
. The 
General Court upheld entirely the Commission's finding that the cartel involving 17 
undertakings and lasting for more than 18 years constituted a single and continuous 
infringement of EU competition law. The cartel consisted of a complex set of arrangements at 
European (Club Zurich/Club Europe) and regional (Club Italia/Club Spain) level, involving 
quota fixing, client sharing, price fixing and exchange of sensitive commercial information on 
pricing, customers and volume/shares in nearly the whole EEA. 
In voestalpine and voestalpine Austria Draht
56
, the General Court not only confirmed 
established case law (notably Suiker unie
57
) that an agent and its principal can be regarded as 
an economic unit in analogy with an employee. It also brought a novel finding, 
acknowledging that an agent acting for two principals at the same time (both involved in the 
cartel) can be an economic unit with each principal and thus the latter can be held liable for 
the conduct of the agent, despite the non-exclusive relationship with each of them. The 
General Court clarified that such liability was to be found as long as the commercial agent 
was acting within his authority: in those cases, he had to be regarded as forming part of the 
undertaking. On the other hand, the General Court took the view that the liability for that 
agent’s anti-competitive actions outside his mandate could not be imputed to voestalpine 
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Austria Draht and reduced the fine imposed jointly and severally on those two companies for 
those conducts. 
Inconsistency between reasoning of decision and operative part 
In 13 judgments handed down on 16 December 2015
58
 relating to the Airfreight decision the 
General Court found an inconsistency between the reasoning of the contested decision and its 
operative part. On the one hand, the reasoning describes a single and continuous infringement 
in which all of the addressees of that decision participated. On the other hand, the first four 
articles of the operative part do not each set out all of the addressees of the contested decision. 
The General Court therefore fully annulled the decision for all but one party which lodged an 
appeal
59
. The General Court did not take a position on whether the Commission could prove 
the infringement or not.  
Article 102 TFEU 
Action for injunction constituting an abuse of a dominant position  
In a judgment adopted following a preliminary reference, the Court of Justice provided legal 
clarity on certain controversial aspects of licensing of standard-essential patents
60
. It 
concluded that the bringing of an action for an injunction for prohibition against an alleged 
infringer by the proprietor of a standard-essential patent holding a dominant position may 
constitute an abuse of that dominant position under certain circumstances  
The judgment is important because it confirms that competition policy has an important role 
to play in the standardisation arena. It also confirms the Commission's approach in the 
Motorola
61
 and Samsung
62
 cases. According to this approach, seeking injunctions based on 
Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs), where a commitment to license on Fair, Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms has been given, can be an abuse of a dominant position 
where the prospective licensee is willing to enter into a licensing agreement on FRAND 
terms. 
Standardised retroactive rebate scheme under Article 102 TFEU 
In Post Danmark II
63
 the Court of Justice gave a preliminary ruling on questions concerning 
the criteria for assessing standardised retroactive rebate schemes under Article 102 TFEU. In 
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particular, the Court of Justice was asked to provide guidance on what relevance should be 
attached to the fact that the rebate scheme is applicable to the majority of customers in the 
market and also to the "as efficient competitor test".  
The Court of Justice reiterated that the assessment of such rebate scheme should be carried 
out in the light of all relevant circumstances, including the rules and the criteria governing the 
grant of the rebates, the number of customers concerned and the characteristics of the market 
in which the dominant undertaking operates. The fact that the rebate scheme concerns a large 
proportion of customers may constitute a useful indication as to the extent and impact of the 
practice and thus to the likelihood of an anti-competitive exclusionary effect, but it is not a 
necessary condition for the finding of an abuse. Such an assessment seeks to determine 
whether the conduct of the dominant undertaking is capable of producing an actual or likely 
exclusionary effect to the detriment of competition, and, thereby of consumers' interest. 
The Court of Justice also made clear that the "as efficient competitor test" is not relevant for 
finding a rebate scheme abusive in the context such as that of the main proceeding, but made 
clear that the application of the test is not excluded on principle and that the test must be 
regarded as one tool amongst others for the purpose of assessing whether there is an abuse in 
the context of rebate schemes.  
The Court of Justice also took a position on whether there is an appreciability (de minimis) 
threshold in the application of Article 102 TFEU. The Court of Justice ruled that if a 
dominant position is present, competition in the market is already restricted and therefore 
abuses should be considered by their very nature liable to give rise to an appreciable 
restriction of competition. 
Article 106 TFEU  
On 25 March the General Court in its judgment in Slovenská pošta64 rejected an application 
for annulment brought against a Commission decision concerning the application of Article 
86(1) EC.  
The General Court dismissed all the pleas of the applicants. Most importantly the General 
Court found that an infringement of Article 106(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 
TFEU may be established irrespective of whether any abuse actually materialises. All that is 
necessary is for the Commission to identify a potential or actual anti-competitive consequence 
liable to result from the State measure at issue. Such an infringement may thus be established 
where the State measure at issue affects the structure of the market by creating unequal 
conditions of competition between companies, by allowing the public undertaking or the 
undertaking which was granted special or exclusive rights to maintain (for example by 
hindering new entrants to the market), strengthen or extend the dominant position over 
another, but neighbouring market, without objective justification.  
Procedural issues 
Rejection of complaints 
In its judgments in Si.mobil and EasyJet the General Court interpreted Article 13 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 for the first time. This provision allows the Commission and 
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National Competition Authorities (NCAs) to reject a complaint on the grounds that another 
NCA "is dealing" or "has dealt" with the same case.  
In Si.Mobil the General Court held that the Commission can reject a complaint solely on the 
basis of Article 13, without the need to also show a lack of EU interest in the case. Moreover, 
the General Court emphasised that Article 13 does not create individual rights for companies 
to have their case dealt with by a particular authority. The General Court further clarified that 
for the purpose of Article 13; "the same case" means the same infringement, in the same 
market and within the same time frame. The condition "dealing with" the same case is met 
when the NCA has taken follow-up steps, but not when the NCA has merely received the 
complaint or has decided to open an investigation.  
In EasyJet, the General Court clarified that the Commission can reject a complaint on the 
grounds that an NCA has dealt with the same case, even if the NCA has rejected the 
complaint on priority grounds and/or has not adopted a formal decision in the meaning of 
Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Inspections 
The Court of Justice confirmed in its Deutsche Bahn
65 
judgment the Commission's position 
that inspections may be carried out based solely on a Commission decision and do not require 
a prior judicial authorisation. This does not infringe the rights of defence or the protection of 
the home as safeguarded in the European Charter of Human Rights.  
The Court of Justice annulled the second and third inspection decisions. These two decisions 
were based on information found during the first inspection at Deutsche Bahn. However, this 
information was outside the scope of the first inspection decision. The Commission can 
actively search only for information that falls within the scope of the inspection decision. If 
the Commission happens to obtain information which is outside the scope of the inspection 
decision, it can use this information to justify a further inspection in order to verify or 
supplement this information. In this specific case the Court of Justice found that the 
Commission had informed its inspectors prior to the first inspection about another complaint 
lodged against Deutsche Bahn without referring to it in the first inspection decision. The 
Commission thereby infringed the obligation to state reasons and the rights of defence of 
Deutsche Bahn and was barred from using the information found outside the scope of the first 
inspection decision to justify a further inspection. 
Publication of Commission decisions 
The publication of cartel decisions is an important element in the Commission's enforcement 
activities. On 28 January, the General Court handed down two judgments
66
 concerning a more 
extensive publication of a 2006 cartel decision of the Commission
67
. For the first time, the 
General Court provided guidance on the application of Article 30 of Regulation 1/2003 on the 
publication of Commission decisions and the publication of certain leniency information. 
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Both applicants had appealed the Hearing Officer´s decisions in which most of their 
confidentiality claims had been rejected.  
The General Court dismissed both applications in their entirety and found that the disputed 
information, which was based on material voluntarily provided by the applicants in order to 
benefit from the leniency programme, was not confidential. The General Court confirmed that 
the publication of this information would not result in the communication to third parties of 
the leniency material provided by the parties. The General Court further confirmed that the 
applicants cannot legitimately oppose the publication by the Commission of information 
revealing the details of their participation in the infringement penalised in the decision on the 
ground that such publication would expose them to increased risk of civil liability. It 
highlighted the wide discretion of the Commission to decide whether to publish information 
which does not benefit from the protection of professional secrecy.  
The July judgments in the Carglass case
68
 also confirm the Commission's right to publish its 
decisions, including information received in the context of leniency applications, as well as 
names of customers and models exchanged by the cartel, pricing information and the number 
of parts and shares of customers' business allocated among the members of the cartel. The 
General Court dismissed almost entirely the action brought by Pilkington and entirely 
dismissed the action brought by AGC against the Hearing Officer's decisions of 6 August 
2012 concerning the publication of a detailed version of the Commission's cartel decision of 
12 November 2008 in Carglass. 
The General Court ruled, inter alia, that the publication of facts on AGC's and Pilkington’s 
participation in the Carglass cartel did not breach the Commission's obligations of 
professional secrecy or the various rights of defence invoked by the applicants, such as the 
rights to equal treatment and legitimate expectations. The General Court also confirmed that 
the Commission is entitled to publish the information acquired from leniency applications in 
its cartel decisions. 
Public access to table of contents  
The AXA
69
 judgment of 7 July is closely related to the Carglass decisions and is of 
importance to the Commission's policy on publications. In this case, AXA requested, under 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, access to: (i) the table of contents (TOC); and (ii) a large 
number of documents contained in the Carglass file. The Commission gave access to a 
version of the TOC in which, inter alia, all items with leniency-related information had been 
redacted. It based its decision on a general presumption of non-disclosure accepted by the EU 
Courts for documents in the case file and performed no individual analysis of the entries in 
question. The Commission also refused access to the documents requested by AXA, based on 
the same general presumption. 
According to the General Court, the Commission applied correctly the general presumption 
that disclosure of the documents in its file would undermine the protection of the purpose of 
inspections. However, the General Court annulled the part of the Commission's decision that 
rejected AXA's request for access to references to leniency documents in the TOC of the 
Carglass file. The TOC was not part of the case file and was, therefore, not covered by the 
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general presumption. The General Court, meanwhile, did uphold the Commission's refusal, 
when making an individual examination, to disclose information on the identity of physical 
persons, the names of third-party undertakings and sensitive commercial information 
contained in the TOC. 
Hybrid settlement in cartels 
The judgment in Timab
70
 was the first time the General Court reviewed a Commission 
decision in the context of a hybrid settlement procedure. This is the first "hybrid" cartel case, 
in which both the settlement procedure and the standard procedure were used, in this case in 
parallel. Timab was the only undertaking that decided not to make a settlement submission 
after having participated in settlement talks and the case reverted to the ordinary procedure as 
regards Timab.  
The General Court held that in the ordinary procedure, the Commission was not bound by the 
fines ranges discussed during settlement discussion, especially since the Commission must 
establish the liabilities of the undertakings concerned while taking account of new arguments 
on evidence brought to its attention (which may have an impact on the size of the fine to be 
imposed). The General Court also rejected Timab's claims that the Commission penalised 
them with a higher fine because they did not settle. The General Court reviewed in detail how 
the fines were calculated in both procedures, checked that the Commission had not 
discriminated compared with other companies in the same cartel case and concluded that the 
Commission had applied the Fines Guidelines correctly. 
3. Fight against cartels remains a top priority 
Well-functioning, competitive markets give rise to innovation and investment because 
companies are forced to innovate and to use their resources in the most efficient way. 
Collusive arrangements may have the effect of preventing the restructuring of economic 
sectors, thereby reducing innovation. The surplus paid by the cartel victims also reduces the 
victims' ability to invest in new areas or purchase other products As the object of cartels is 
precisely to eliminate differences between competitors in critical parameters of competition 
such as prices, the Commission's anti-cartel enforcement has positive effects on 
differentiation between companies. 
The Commission's strong enforcement record against hard core cartels continued in 2015. As 
in preceding years, the Commission adopted cartel decisions in important sectors for 
innovation and investment, such as the financial markets and the automotive industry.  
Settlement cases have accounted for a significant proportion of the decisions adopted this 
year, confirming that this instrument is now fully established. As discussed above, it is of 
major importance for the Commission's enforcement practice that the General Court 
confirmed in Timab the legality of "hybrid" cases in which both ordinary and settlement 
decisions are adopted in the same investigation. This is because some parties do not wish to 
follow the settlement route.  
The flow of immunity and leniency applications continues to be substantial in a large number 
of economic sectors. The Antitrust Damages Directive that entered into force on 26 December 
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2014 endorsed the effectiveness of the public enforcement system by setting out that leniency 
statements and settlement submissions can never be disclosed in the context of private 
damages litigation. 
This year, the Commission adopted two settlement decisions against all of the participants in 
the cartels concerning Parking Heaters
71
 (17 June) and Blocktrains
72
 (15 July). 
The Blocktrains settlement case 
The Blocktrains case is the first cartel case in the rail cargo transport services sector. 
The Commission imposed fines of EUR 49.1 million on three companies for operating a cartel for so-called 
cargo "blocktrain" services. "Blocktrains" are a rail shipping system to transport cargo from one hub to another 
without wagons being split up or stored on the way. This saves time and money for customers from a wide range 
of industries, in particular those with large volumes to transport. In principle, blocktrains are economically more 
efficient than traditional rail cargo transport, particularly for single commodity shipping. 
The "blocktrains" covered by the cartel, named "Balkantrain" and "Soptrain", were jointly operated by 
Kühne+Nagel, Express Interfracht and Schenker and connect central Europe with south eastern Europe. 
The three undertakings fixed prices and allocated customers of their "Balkantrain" and "Soptrain" services in 
Europe between July 2004 and June 2012. The infringement concerned the down-stream sales of cargo transport 
services in connection with the blocktrains mentioned above. 
The Commission's investigation in this case started with unannounced inspections in June 2013. The Blocktrains 
decision was adopted under the settlement procedure concerning all three parties. Kühne+Nagel received full 
immunity under the Commission's Leniency Notice for revealing the existence of the cartel, while the two other 
undertakings received fines reductions as leniency applicants. 
On 4 February, the Commission completed its investigation of seven cartels in the Yen 
interest rate derivatives (YIRD) sector by adopting an ordinary decision against the UK-based 
broker ICAP, who acted as a facilitator in six of those collusions
73
. In December 2013, the 
Commission imposed fines on a number of major banks that decided to settle the case with 
the Commission. 
Ordinary procedures remain significant because not all investigations may be eligible for 
settlement discussions. Relevant factors include the number of parties, the proportion of 
leniency applicants in relation to the total number of parties, the degree of contestation, 
conflicting positions between the parties and the existence of novel features or aggravating 
circumstances in the investigated practices.  
When the right circumstances are not met, the Commission will apply the ordinary procedure. 
Two ordinary decisions were adopted in 2015: Retail Food Packaging
74
 (24 June) and Optical 
Disc Drives
75
 (21 October). 
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The Optical Disc Drives (ODDs) case 
ODDs are devices where optical discs (such as CDs, DVDs or Blu-ray) are inserted in order to read and/or 
record data. They are used for instance in personal computers, CD and DVD players or even video game 
consoles.  
In this case, the cartel related to ODDs used for laptops and desktops. Leading suppliers of ODDs (Philips, Lite-
On, their joint venture Philips & Lite-On, Hitachi-LG Data Storage, Toshiba Samsung Storage Technology, 
Sony, Sony Optiarc and Quanta Storage) manipulated the procurement events organised by two major 
customers, Dell and Hewlett-Packard. The investigation revealed that between June 2004 and November 2008, 
the companies discussed their intentions regarding bidding strategies, shared the results of procurement events, 
and exchanged other commercially sensitive information. The cartel consisted of a network of parallel bilateral 
contacts, which pursued a single plan of avoiding aggressive competition.  
The ODD decision was adopted in ordinary (non-settlement) procedure on 21 October. The aggregate fine 
imposed amounted to EUR 116 million. Philips, Lite-On and Philips & Lite-On jointly received full immunity 
from fines as they were the first to reveal the cartel to the Commission, thereby avoiding a total fine of EUR 63.5 
million. No inspections were conducted in this case because the participants were based outside the EU. 
The Commission remains committed to pursuing all cartels across all sectors where it has 
sufficient evidence of an infringement (more information on the cartel decisions is available 
in the sectoral overview). A number of statements of objections were also adopted by the 
Commission, such as against the non-settling parties in mushrooms
76
, in car battery 
recycling
77
 and capacitors
78
.  
The Commission's cartel enforcement record remains strong and effective, with five 
decisions, fines totalling approximately EUR 365 million and solid work for enforcement in 
future years. 
Case name Adoption 
date 
Fine imposed 
EUR 
Undertaking
s concerned  
Prohibition 
Procedure 
Yen interest rates 
derivatives  
04/02/2015 14 960 000 1 Hybrid* 
Parking heaters 17/06/2015 68 175 000 2 Settlement 
Retail food packaging 24/06/2015 115 865 000 10 Normal 
Blocktrains 15/07/2015 49 154 000 3 Settlement 
Optical disc drives 21/10/2015 116 377 000 7 Normal 
*normal procedure part of a hybrid case with a settlement decision in December 2013 
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Antitrust and cartel output 
 
4. Continuing close cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) 
and with national courts  
The national competition authorities (NCAs) are essential partners of the Commission for 
enforcing the EU competition rules. Since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 in 2004, 
NCAs are empowered to apply the EU competition rules in full alongside the Commission. 
This is done in close cooperation in the European Competition Network (ECN). Together the 
Commission and the NCAs have adopted more than 1000 decisions in antitrust cases of which 
85 % have been taken by NCAs. Through their enforcement work, the NCAs play a key role 
in making sure that the single market works well and fairly for the benefit of consumers and 
businesses and driving economic growth. However, while Regulation 1/2003 focused on 
giving the NCAs the power to co-enforce the EU competition rules, the 2014 Commission 
Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003
79
 identified a number of areas of action to 
strengthen the enforcement powers of NCAs. It showed that there is still room for 
improvement to further boost competition enforcement in Europe, make markets more 
competitive and give consumers a better choice of goods and services at lower prices. 
Therefore, in November the Commission launched a public consultation on empowering the 
NCAs to be more effective enforcers
80
. The Commission invites feedback from a broad range 
of stakeholders on potential improvements to guarantee that NCAs (i) have the right tools to 
detect and sanction violations of the EU competition rules; (ii) have effective leniency 
programmes that encourage companies to come forward, possibly in several jurisdictions, 
with evidence of illegal cartels; and (iii) have adequate resources and are sufficiently 
independent when enforcing EU competition law. The Commission will carefully review all 
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input received in the public consultation before deciding whether and to what extent it should 
take further action, possibly including an EU legislative initiative. 
Cooperation with national courts 
In addition to its cooperation with NCAs in the context of the ECN, the Commission also 
continued its cooperation with national courts (NCs) under Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003. 
The Commission helps NCs to enforce the EU competition rules in an effective and coherent 
manner by providing case-related information or an opinion on matters of substance or by 
intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before the NCs. 
In 2015, the Commission thus replied to one request for information and four requests for 
opinion from NCs under Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003. The request for information was 
combined with one of the requests for an opinion and was issued by a United Kingdom court 
in a case relating to financial services. One of the remaining three requests for opinion was 
issued by a Hungarian court and related to the notion of anti-competitive effects of an 
infringement and the extent to which they have to be proven in order to serve as evidence. 
Another request for opinion was submitted by a Latvian court and related to the question of 
interaction between the EU antitrust rules (Article 102 TFEU) and the State aid rules (Article 
107 TFEU). The remaining request for opinion was issued by a Romanian court and 
concerned potential infringements in the framework of Buy Back campaigns under the 
Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on 
waste electrical and electronic equipment. 
In 2015, the Commission also intervened as amicus curiae in two court proceedings: 
One of the interventions related to the application of the EU competition rules in the fruit and 
vegetables sector. In the underlying case, the French NCA had imposed fines on several 
chicory producer organisations and associations of producer organisations for an infringement 
of Article 101 (1) TFEU and the equivalent national rules. The Court of Appeal quashed the 
NCA decision based, inter alia, on the ground that fixing minimum prices and volumes and 
exchanging commercially sensitive information by chicory producers does not constitute an 
infringement of competition rules.  
According to the Court of Appeal, the NCA had failed to demonstrate that the producers 
exceeded the scope of the legal missions conferred on them by the EU and/or national 
agricultural rules. The applicable agricultural legislation had therefore authorised the practices 
of chicory producers and Article 101(1) TFEU was inapplicable to the behaviour at hand. The 
case was appealed before the French Court of Cassation.  
In its observations, the Commission rebutted the claim of non-applicability of competition 
rules in the agricultural sector by referring in general terms to the existence of general and 
specific derogations from EU competition rules. It also underlined that both derogations from 
EU competition rules should be interpreted in a restrictive manner and be limited to the 
specific activities described in the derogations. The Commission also pointed out that it had 
held exclusive competence for allowing a general derogation from the EU competition rules 
(e.g. Article 2(2) of Council Regulation No 26/1962) at the time of the facts of the case, but 
had not granted such derogation at the time. The Court of Cassation suspended the 
proceedings and asked for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice under Article 267 
TFEU. 
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The second amicus intervention took place in a transport case before the Spanish Supreme 
Court and related to the interpretation of the national provisions on the 10 % cap on fines and 
in particular on the notion of "sales volumes" and "total turnover". Although the calculation of 
fines imposed by NCAs is not regulated or harmonised in EU legislation, the Commission 
underlined in its observations the need for imposing effective sanctions. This is ensured, 
among others, through the deterrent character of the fines imposed. 
The Commission publishes its opinions and amicus curiae observations on its website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html) as soon as it receives approval from 
the courts concerned. 
Merger control 
 
EU merger control  
The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while facilitating 
smooth restructuring of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company 
active on the EU markets. Industry restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of 
production assets. However, there are also situations where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful 
effects on competition, taking into account the merging companies' degree of market power and other market 
features. EU merger control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead to harmful effects on 
competition do not occur.  
Competition is one of the key drivers for innovation and investment. In protecting competitive 
market structures, EU merger control also contributed to innovation and investment across 
Europe in 2015. The substantive test for assessing mergers under the current legal framework 
is based on a significant impediment of effective competition. This test covers all aspects of a 
loss of competition, including harm to innovation. Moreover, EU merger control takes into 
account efficiencies brought about by mergers, which bring positive effects on innovation 
provided they are verifiable, merger-specific and likely to be passed on to consumers. The 
Commission's enforcement practice in 2015 shows that it considers innovation and 
investments as important aspects of competition (see section below on recent enforcement 
trends). 
As highlighted in previous reports on competition policy, the Commission continuously 
evaluates the substantive and procedural rules that make up the legal framework, in force for 
merger control. In this context, the Commission also assesses concerns voiced by industry 
representatives and other stakeholders and checks that its policies and enforcement practices 
do not unduly create red-tape for companies and thereby hamper innovation and investment. 
If necessary, policy changes are proposed (see points 1 to 3 below). 
1. Geographic market definition in European Commission merger control 
In recent years, some stakeholders have raised concerns that the Commission fails to take due 
account of increasing globalisation and therefore assesses mergers using too narrowly defined 
geographic markets. Some stakeholders have also claimed that when the Commission defines 
the relevant geographic market for the purpose of assessing mergers notified to it, it does not 
sufficiently take into account that potential competitors who were previously not active in a 
specific market may start supplying that market following a merger ("supply-side 
substitution").  
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Responding to these views, the Commission published a policy brief entitled "Market 
definition in a globalised world" in March
81
. The brief sets out the Commission's principles 
for determining the geographic area affected by a merger. It also analyses how globalisation 
affects how the relevant geographic market is defined.  
The Commission also commissioned an independent economic report on the topic of 
"Geographic Market Definition in European Commission Merger Control". The authors, 
Professors Lyons and Fletcher, were asked to evaluate the Commission's approach to 
geographic market definition on the basis of a sample of 10 recent decisions in merger cases. 
In their report, the authors largely confirm the Commission's approach to geographic market 
definition and found that the Commission's geographic market definition practice took 
sufficient account of globalisation. They also disagreed with the specific suggestions to 
strengthen the weight of supply side factors in defining relevant geographic markets. The 
report also made some technical recommendations on how the Commission could further 
improve its assessment of the relevant geographic dimensions for a notified transaction. The 
authors recommend in particular that the Commission adopts an even stricter approach to 
supply-side substitutability at the market definition stage, applies greater flexibility in the use 
of non-political geographic market boundaries, such as isochrones, and adopts a formal 
methodology for the treatment of transport costs.  
The White Paper "Towards more effective EU merger control" 
In the White Paper "Towards more effective EU merger control" adopted in July 2014
82
, the 
Commission made some concrete proposals to improve the Merger Regulation in a few areas. 
Those mainly concern the possible extension of the EU Merger Regulation to minority 
shareholdings and a proposed streamlining of the referral system and other procedures.  
In light of the views expressed by stakeholders during the public consultation on the White 
Paper, the proportionality of a possible review system for minority shareholdings will be 
further assessed. For this purpose, the Commission engaged in further discussions with 
relevant stakeholders on how to design an effective system for reviewing minority 
shareholdings that would pose as little administrative burden as possible on companies. 
2. Guidance on merger control proceedings 
In 2015, the Commission published two guidance documents on procedural aspects of EU 
merger control, which make the Commission's proceedings more transparent for companies 
and their legal representatives and thereby increase predictability and efficiency: 
 The Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission Decisions adopted 
under the Merger Regulation, published on 26 May
83
; and 
 The Best Practices on the disclosure of information in data rooms in proceedings under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and under the EU Merger Regulation
84
, published on 2 June. 
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3. Recent enforcement trends 
The number of notified mergers increased significantly in 2015 compared with the previous 
six years. Overall, 360 transactions were notified, including 33 reasoned pre-notification 
submissions by the notifying parties to request the referral of a case from the Commission to a 
Member State or from a Member State to the Commission. In 11 cases, the Commission 
opened in-depth investigations (second phase). These cases concerned various industry 
sectors, including the manufacture of engines and turbines, energy production, telecoms, 
music rights management, the manufacture of paper and packaging material, the distribution 
of office products, the manufacture of beverage cans and aluminium bottles, food & 
beverages and small package delivery services. 
In 2015 the Commission took 318 final decisions in merger cases
85
. In two cases, the parties 
abandoned a transaction during the in-depth investigation. The number of 22 interventions in 
2015 was significantly higher compared with the average of the last six years, which 
amounted to around 15 interventions per year. In 2015, 13 mergers were cleared subject to 
commitments in first phase and seven in the second phase. There was no case where the 
Commission had to prohibit a notified transaction.  
Merger decisions: 
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4. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in mergers 
On 9 March, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment brought by Deutsche 
Börse against the Commission decision of February 2012
86
 declaring the proposed merger 
between Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext incompatible with the internal market
87
. The 
General Court's judgment is of general interest in relation to the Commission's assessment of 
efficiencies submitted by the notifying party. The General Court supported the Commission's 
analytical framework for efficiencies as set out in the in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and 
explicitly stated that the burden of proof for efficiency claims is on the notifying party. 
On 13 May, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment brought by Niki Luftfahrt 
against the Commission decision of August 2009
88
 declaring the proposed acquisition of 
Austrian Airlines by Deutsche Lufthansa AG compatible with the internal market subject to 
conditions and obligations
89
. The judgment follows the line of the previous case law regarding 
airline mergers. It confirmed the methodology for defining markets (according to the origin & 
destination approach), the competitive assessment (focused on individual routes but also 
taking into account network effects) and the design of remedies in the industry (in particular 
slot remedies). 
Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy 
The globalisation of the economy calls for closer cooperation among competition authorities 
not only in Europe, but also across the globe. International cooperation between competition 
agencies helps to ensure that the challenges of globalisation are managed in an effective 
manner and promotes convergence on competition policy principles and practices 
implemented throughout the world. This is why the Commission is seeking to strengthen the 
role of competition policy in international negotiations and in international organisations and 
cooperates with competition agencies globally. Such regulatory and enforcement cooperation 
helps to ensure effective enforcement and a level playing field for European companies active 
on global markets. 
1. Bilateral relations 
At the international level, the Commission is holding negotiations on Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) with the aim to include competition and State aid provisions in such agreements. In 
2015 Commissions international priorities included the negotiations with the United States on 
a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), launched in 2013. In 
addition, significant progress was made during in 2015 on another important agreement 
currently being negotiated, namely the FTA with Japan. In 2015 the Commission also focused 
its efforts on negotiating the competition provisions included in the FTA with Vietnam. The 
competition provisions in this FTA on which an agreement in principle was reached, might 
help to set a new standard for the region or even further afield.  
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The Commission also assists in the implementation of the competition provisions included in 
recent FTAs with neighbouring countries. It is involved in negotiating the necessary 
implementing rules to this effect with Tunisia and Morocco, as well as monitoring the 
implementation of the EU competition acquis, including the State aid rules, in countries such 
as Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, in September a first meeting took place with Korea on 
the implementation of the chapter on competition of the EU-Korea FTA. The discussion in 
particular covered progress on the implementation of the provisions on subsidies and an 
exchange of experiences. 
Negotiations between the Commission and its Canadian counterparts to include provisions on 
the exchange of information into the existing EU-Canada Cooperation agreement have made 
good progress. The present agreement does not make provision for the Commission and the 
Canadian Competition Bureau to exchange evidence collected in the course of their respective 
proceedings. The possibility to exchange such evidence would improve cooperation between 
both competition authorities in all competition cases which affect both markets and would 
lead to more effective and more efficient competition law enforcement. 
Another key area of Commission activity at the international level is technical cooperation 
with main trading partners that are developing their competition policy and enforcement 
regime and with which the Commission has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). 
The Commission has signed MoUs with most BRICS countries in recent years and has 
engaged in technical cooperation with these countries to varying degrees. The Commission's 
technical cooperation activities with the Chinese competition authorities is particularly 
noteworthy and continued throughout 2015 under the cooperation programme (EUCTP II
90
). 
On enforcement, on 15 October the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
and the Commission signed a Practical Guidance for Cooperation on Reviewing Merger 
Cases with a view to making cooperation on merger review more efficient. Finally, the 
programme for technical cooperation with the Indian competition authorities, CITD
91
, 
continued and will run until 2018. 
2. Enlargement 
The Commission's main policy objective in the accession negotiations with candidate 
countries, in addition to fostering a competition culture, is to further help candidate countries 
and potential candidate countries to build up a proper legislative framework, well-functioning 
competition authorities and an efficient enforcement practice in order for them to meet the 
conditions for EU accession in the competition policy field. 
The opening benchmarks for negotiations of the competition chapter with Serbia are 
identified in the 2015 Serbia Report
92
. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force on 1 June. The European Union concluded a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo in October 2015, The agreement is 
expected to enter into force in the first half of 2016 after ratification by the European 
Parliament.  
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3. Multilateral cooperation 
The Commission also continued its active engagement in competition-related international 
fora such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the International Competition 
Network (ICN), the World Bank and UNCTAD.  
Three major work streams of the OECD to which the Commission contributed in 2015 were 
ex post evaluation, competitive neutrality and disruptive innovation. On ex post evaluation, 
the Commission contributed to the drafting of a practical OECD Guide. Also, at the particular 
initiative of the Commission, the OECD organised a hearing and roundtable discussion on 
different aspects of competitive neutrality. This discussion resulted in an OECD advocacy 
document, informing other policy communities how competition law can level the 
competitive field and serve other policies, and in an inventory on competitive neutrality 
frameworks and provisions under national law. On disruptive innovation, the Commission 
contributed to three dedicated OECD sessions addressing the enforcement and specific 
sectorial aspects of this topic.  
In 2015 the Commission continued co-chairing the Mergers Working Group of ICN and one 
of the sub-groups of the Cartel Working Group. It also organised a Merger Working Group 
workshop which took place in Brussels (24-25 September) and which was used to road-test 
the Merger Working Group's Practical Guide for International Merger Enforcement 
Cooperation, adopted in May, for which the Commission was the project leader
93
. As co-chair 
of the ICN Cartel Working Group's Subgroup I on Legislation, the Commission contributed to 
developing a Catalogue on investigative powers and the organisation of several webinars on 
different aspects of anti-cartel enforcement. 
The Commission participated in the Inaugural Conference on Competition Policy, Shared 
Prosperity and Inclusive Growth organised by the World Bank
94
 in partnership with the 
OECD. The paper it presented illustrated the redistributive effects of competition policy in 
favour of poorer households. The same issue was discussed at the OECD Global Competition 
Forum
95
 held later in the year.  
The Commission also participated in the seventh UNCTAD Review Conference on 
competition in Geneva in July 2015. The conference included discussion of the benefits and 
the role of competition for consumers in the pharmaceutical sector and the role of 
international cooperation in merger cases as a tool for effective enforcement of competition 
law. The Commission submitted written contributions to both discussions. 
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II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of policy developments and enforcement activities in a 
number of selected sectors that the Commission particularly focused on in 2015. These were 
energy and environment, ICT and media, financial services, tax planning practices, basic 
industries and manufacturing, pharmaceutical and health services and transport and postal 
services. 
 1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
On 25 February the Commission published a new energy policy framework entitled "the 
Energy Union framework strategy"
96
. The strategy addresses three long-standing challenges 
in the energy sector: security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. To address these 
challenges, the Energy Union Strategy focuses on five mutually supportive dimensions: 
 energy security, solidarity and trust; 
 the internal energy market; 
 energy efficiency as a contribution to the moderation of energy demand; 
 decarbonisation of the economy and; 
 research, innovation and competitiveness. 
 
The European Council endorsed this framework in its conclusions of 19-20 March
97
. 
Key figures to illustrate the challenges to reach a low-carbon, secure and competitive EU energy system
98
 
The EU is the largest energy importer in the world, importing 53 % of its energy, at an annual cost of around 
EUR 400 billion. A few Member States are dependent on one single external supplier for all their gas 
imports.Almost half of the Member States do not meet the EU's minimum interconnection target for at least 10 
% of installed electricity production capacity to be able to "cross borders". An appropriately interconnected 
European energy grid could save consumers up to EUR 40 billion a year. Over EUR 1 trillion needs to be 
invested into the EU energy sector by 2020 alone in order to achieve the EU climate and energy targets. 
Wholesale electricity prices in Europe are 30 % higher and wholesale gas prices over 100 % higher than in the 
United States. By 2030, the EU aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 % compared to 1990, boost 
renewable energy to achieve the target of at least 27 % of renewables in its energy mix, and improve energy 
efficiency by at least 27 %.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
The main challenges in 2015 continued to be high energy prices, the slow pace of investment 
in the energy sector and security of supply concerns stemming from i) lack of competition; 
and ii) insufficient diversification of gas supplies in eastern Europe.  
In 2015, EU competition policy contributed to tackling those challenges in several ways. 
Antitrust and mergers enforcement contributed by lifting obstacles to competition and barriers 
to trade between Member States and by ensuring that investments in the energy sector do not 
hamper competition.  
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Improving competitiveness across the energy sector 
Competition enforcement and advocacy play a key role in making the internal energy market 
work. Competition enforcement leads to opening markets, creating a level playing field 
between competitors and ultimately promoting investment and innovation. Competition 
enforcement sanctions collusion and abuses of dominant positions, ensures that mergers do 
not hamper effective competition and creates a framework for investment that avoids 
distortions and ensures the efficient allocation of public resources. In 2015, antitrust 
enforcement actions have challenged practices that partition the internal markets and practices 
that prevent new entrants from accessing the market. These behaviours lead to higher energy 
prices. 
On 10 December, the Commission accepted99 the commitments offered by the Bulgarian 
Energy Holding (BEH) to solve competition concerns in the wholesale electricity markets in 
Bulgaria. The Commission was concerned that BEH had been selling electricity to traders 
using contracts which prohibited them from reselling the electricity outside Bulgaria. As a 
result BEH was hindering the resale of electricity and abusing its dominance by imposing 
territorial restrictions on traders. BEH has committed to solving these concerns by setting up 
an independent and liquid power exchange in Bulgaria through which electricity can be traded 
anonymously, with no possibility of checking where it is resold. 
On 22 October, the Commission sent a Letter of Formal Notice to France setting out its 
concerns that France may be in breach of EU antitrust rules by having granted to state-owned 
Electricité de France (EDF) most of the country's concessions for exploiting hydropower
100
. 
The Commission is concerned that granting most of the country's hydropower concessions to 
EDF at preferential financial conditions, without a tendering procedure and for very long 
periods has maintained or strengthened EDF's dominance in the French electricity markets 
possibly counter to Article 106 TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU.  
A key principle underlying the Commission's State aid policy is that public support should 
result in a positive balance between the objectives achieved and the potentitial negative 
effects of State intervention on the European energy market. In this context the Commission 
pays special attention to any market distortions that may arise as a result of public financing, 
such as the crowding out of investment, negative effects on upstream or downstream markets 
and excessive profits which may lead to strengthened market posititions, deterrence of new 
entrants and ultimately market foreclosure. To ensure that such market distortions are avoided 
the Commission launched two formal investigation procedures– the first into public measures 
taken by the United Kingdom in favour of the Lynemouth power plant
101
 and the second into 
the project to build the new Paks II
102
 nuclear power plant in Hungary.  
Contributing to a low-carbon economy 
The EU is committed to reducing by at least 40 % its greenhouse gas emissions compared 
with 1990. The EU has also set a target that by 2030 renewable energy will account for at 
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least 27 % of the energy consumed in the EU. This will require significant investment and the 
progressive integration of renewables into a market that promotes competitive renewables and 
drives innovation.  
The rules passed in July 2014 (Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy
103
) require renewable electricity producers to sell the electricity directly on the market. 
In addition, Member States may grant a premium to compensate for the extra costs of those 
technologies that are not yet able to compete with conventional generation technologies. 
Furthermore, renewable electricity producers will be subject to standard balancing 
responsibilities and production should not be incentivised when wholesale prices turn 
negative. The Commission approved several support schemes which follow already these 
market-based assessment criteria.  
In 2015 the Commission adopted a number of decisions aimed at incentivising investment in 
renewable energy sources while applying the requirements for a market-based approach to the 
selection of beneficiaries and the form of aid. Among the support measures approved in 2015 
for renewable generation the ones that stand out are the aid to 20 individual offshore wind 
farms
104
 in Germany, the support scheme to renewable energy sources in Croatia
105
 and the 
amendments to the Romanian green certificates support system for promoting renewable 
electricity
106
.  
The Commission strives to ensure that public support is granted in a way that fosters 
investments in new and innovative technologies that will not only make the European energy 
sector more competitive but will also spur research and innovation in clean and sustainable 
generation. During 2015, the Commission adopted two decisions on support measures aimed 
at developing ocean energy and offshore power generation technologies in experimental or 
pre-commercial stage
107
. 
The new Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 also 
bring under the scope of the Guidelines support for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and 
infrastructure. 
Finally, the new Framework for State aid for R&D&I offers important opportunities as it 
allows tailored support to projects which are not, in themselves, profitable but might generate 
beyond R&D specific externalities, important environmental benefits to society. 
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Furthermore, the Commission approved State aid for the deployment of publicly available 
charging infrastructure for electrical vehicles
108
, which will also increase sustainability and 
reducing emissions. 
The Commission's antitrust enforcement is also contributing to the objective of a low carbon 
economy. The Commission is investigating whether ethanol producers may have colluded to 
manipulate ethanol benchmarks published by the price reporting agency Platts, for example 
by agreeing between each other to submit or support bids with a view so as push benchmarks 
upwards and thus drive up ethanol prices
109
. Such practices, if confirmed, harm competition 
and undermine EU energy objectives by increasing prices for renewable energy, in this case 
biofuels used for transport. This could lead to a reduction of the use of biofuels as an 
alternative to fossil fuels, with negative consequences both for consumers and the objective of 
a low-carbon economy. The on-going antitrust investigation into Austria's waste management 
markets also feeds into action to achieve greater sustainability
110
. 
Contributing to security of supply 
In the gas sector, lack of diversification and consequently of competition in sources of supply 
is a concern for the security of supply in the EU. Some Member States continue to rely on one 
single supplier and often on one single supply route for 80 % to 100 % of their gas 
consumption
111
, whereas those Member States with a diverse portfolio of gas suppliers and 
supply routes and with well-developed gas markets reap the benefit of paying less for imports.  
In 2015 the Commission adopted a decision on public support for nine gas infrastructure 
projects in Poland
112
, which will help diversification of gas supplies. In addition to 
strengthening the security of supply in central Europe, the decision to support the realisation 
of the nine gas projects also incentivesed investment in gas infrastructure which would not 
have been possible without the State aid contribution.  
Nine gas infrastructure projects in Poland 
The Commission found that Poland's plans to grant aid of PLN 3,13 billion (EUR 758 million) for nine gas 
projects in Poland are compatible with EU State aid rules. 
Five of the nine gas infrastructure projects will connect European gas supply sources from the Baltic, Adriatic 
and the Black Sea to the rest of Europe via Poland (as part of the "North-South gas interconnection priority 
corridor") thus increasing the diversification of gas supply in Poland. The rest of the projects will contribute to 
an increase in the overall level of security of supply in Poland by eliminating bottlenecks and providing 
additional capacity to the existing gas networks. 
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The Commission's antitrust enforcement can also help to solve security of supply issues by 
facilitating access to the market and encouraging investment. On 22 April, the Commission 
sent a Statement of Objections to Gazprom for allegedly abusing its dominant position in the 
supply of natural gas in central and eastern Europe
113
. The Commission considers that 
Gazprom is abusing its dominant position inter alia by imposing territorial restrictions in its 
supply agreements with wholesalers and with some industrial customers. The Commission 
has concerns that this market segmentation may also have enabled Gazprom to charge unfair 
prices in several of the countries concerned.  
On 23 March, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to BEH
114
, and its gas supply 
and gas infrastructure subsidiaries, Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz over a possible abuse of 
dominant position on the Bulgarian natural gas markets. The Commission is concerned that 
BEH and its subsidiaries have refused to give competitors access to the Bulgarian gas 
transmission network and the only gas storage facility in Bulgaria and may have booked 
capacity they do not need on Bulgaria's only viable gas import pipeline.  
In the electricity sector, there are increasing concerns about generation adequacy and 
insufficient investment in new capacity due to market uncertainties and regulatory 
interventions. An increasing number of Member States are introducing capacity mechanisms 
to encourage investment in new capacity e.g. power plants or to provide incentives that power 
plants to continue to operate, so that the supply of electricity meets demand at all times. In 
April, the Commission launched a State aid sector inquiry into existing and planned capacity 
mechanisms in the EU. The purpose of the inquiry is to analyse the need for such mechanisms 
and to identify design features that distort competition between capacity providers or hinder 
cross-border electricity trade. 
State aid sector inquiry – Existing and planned capacity mechanisms in the EU115 
Capacity mechanisms are measures taken by Member States to ensure that electricity supply can match demand 
in the medium and long-term at all times. They are designed to support investment to fill an expected capacity 
gap and ensure security of supply. 
The Commission sent different sets of questions to selected public authorities and market participants in 11 
Member States - Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden. It assessed the replies and invites comments on its preliminary findings in early 2016. The final results 
will be published by the end of 2016. 
The sector inquiry will supplement and support the implementation of the Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy
116
 that entered into force in July 2014. Moreover, the sector inquiry will 
contribute to the Commission's legislative proposal on electricity market design under the EU's Energy Union 
Strategy. 
Merger control 
In the field of merger control, the trend for investments in European energy infrastructure by 
investment companies persisted
117
. In 2015, as in the previous years, a number of companies 
                                                          
113
 Case AT.39816 Upstream Gas Supplies in central and eastern Europe. For further information see 
IP/15/4828 of 22 April 2015
.
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4828_en.htm  
114
 Case AT.39849 BEH gas. For further information see IP/15/4651 of 23 March 2015 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4651_en.htm  
115 For further information see IP/15/4891 of 29 April 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-4891_en.htm  
116
 See footnote 103. 
117
 Cases M.7840 Letterone Holdings/E.On E&P Norge; Commission decision of 2 December 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7840; M.7490 Macquarie/ Wren 
 41 
invested in development
118
 and production from renewable sources
119
 such as wind parks
120
, 
solar parks
121
 and waste-to-energy plants
122
.  
The Commission also observed that some oil and gas markets players reorganised their 
business by streamlining their activities in the upstream segment of exploration and 
development of reservoirs
123
 while partially divesting their presence in the downstream/retail 
segment to other oil companies, traders or financial investors
124
. The upstream segment for 
the exploration and development of reservoirs is fragmented, with a significant number of 
players competing and with national oil companies playing a significant role. 
 
 2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (ICT) AND MEDIA  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
ICT and media are key sectors for the EU economy. As well as being important consumer 
businesses, they play a critical role as inputs to the wider economy. They are a driver for 
innovation and growth in many other sectors, such as energy, transportation, public services, 
health and education
125
.  
The nature of these industries presents both opportunities and challenges. If the right 
framework conditions are in place, including appropriate competition rules, these sectors can 
make a decisive contribution to growth and employment. In the period 2005-2010, ICT 
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investment accounted for one-third of EU growth
126
. However, the importance of these 
sectors and the very rapid pace of change also create challenges for regulators in ensuring that 
regulatory rules and enforcement keep pace with technological change. 
One of the 10 political priorities of the present Commission is to complete a Digital Single 
Market in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and 
where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under 
conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, 
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence. Bringing down barriers within the 
Digital Single Market could contribute an additional EUR 415 billion to EU GDP
127
.  
Digital Single Market (DSM) 
The Commission adopted its Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy in May. The strategy comprises 16 actions 
under three pillars: (i) better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe; 
(ii) creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish; and (iii) maximising the growth 
potential of our European Digital Economy. Competition policy is directly involved through the e-commerce 
sector inquiry, which is one of the 16 actions. Reaching the goals of the DSM also requires competition 
enforcement to help ensure competitive markets for ICT and media services.  
In order to fully benefit from the deployment of new innovative digital services, consumers in all Member States 
need to have access to high performance networks. By 2020, the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) aims at 
achieving (i) full coverage of 30 Mbps services (fast broadband) and (ii) provision of 100 Mbps services (ultra-
fast broadband) to 50 % of Europeans. Building on the results of its public consultation on the needs for internet 
speed and quality beyond 2020 and in order to ensure that everyone can reap the benefits of the DSM, the 
Commission is developing broadband vision beyond 2020. 
One of the key actions under the second pillar of the DSM strategy is the review of the telecoms regulatory 
framework, the preparatory work for which has already started.  
In addition, on 25 November, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation laying down 
measures concerning open internet access and roaming on public mobile communication networks
128
. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
E-commerce sector inquiry 
Eurostat figures for 2014 show that while 50 % of Europeans had shopped online in the past 
year, only 15 % had done so cross-border
129
. There are indications that one of the reasons for 
the lack of cross-border online trade is the existence of contractual barriers, particularly 
distribution agreements which may restrict the cross-border sale of goods and digital content. 
For example, 22 % of wholesale and retail trade companies say the fact that their suppliers 
restrict or forbid them to sell abroad is a problem
130
. It is estimated that welfare gains from e-
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commerce in goods in an integrated DSM could reach over EUR 200 billion, with two thirds 
of these gains coming from increased online choice
131
. 
E-commerce sector inquiry 
The Commission launched a sector inquiry into e-commerce markets in May
132
. The inquiry aims to gather 
market information in order to better understand the nature, prevalence and effects of barriers to online trade 
erected by companies, and to assess them in light of EU antitrust rules. If, after analysing the results, the 
Commission identifies specific competition concerns, it may open individual investigations to enforce the 
competition rules and provide guidance to businesses on the types of restrictions that are permissible online. The 
results may also be useful as inputs into the other actions within the DSM strategy. 
The Commission expects to publish a preliminary report for consultation in mid-2016. The final report is 
expected to follow in 2017. 
Antitrust enforcement linked to media and sports.  
In the broadcasting sector, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections in July against 
six major United States film studios
133
 (Disney, NBC Universal, Paramount Pictures, Sony, 
Twentieth Century Fox and Warner Bros.) and Sky UK. The Commission's preliminary view 
is that clauses in licensing agreements between the studios and Sky UK that restrict, e.g. 
through geo-blocking, cross-border access to films, thereby limit Sky UK's ability to accept 
unsolicited requests for its pay-tv services from consumers located outside the United 
Kingdom and Ireland (so-called "passive sales"). Certain agreements also contain clauses 
requiring the film studios to ensure that, in their licensing agreements with broadcasters other 
than Sky UK, these broadcasters are prevented from making their pay-tv services available in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
In April, the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's findings on the assignment of 
broadcasting authorisations for digital terrestrial television in Bulgaria. In January 2013, the 
Commission referred Bulgaria to the Court of Justice considering that the procedure followed 
by Bulgaria was based on disproportionately restrictive award conditions, leading to the 
exclusion of potential candidates and hampering competition.  
In the publishing sector, the Commission opened a formal investigation into some of 
Amazon's e-book distribution arrangements in June. The Commission will, in particular, 
investigate clauses in Amazon's contracts with publishers requiring them to inform Amazon 
about more favourable or alternative terms offered to Amazon's competitors and/or offer 
Amazon similar terms and conditions to its competitors. The Commission has concerns that 
such clauses may make it more difficult for other e-book distributors to compete with 
Amazon. 
In the sports sector, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation in October into 
the International Skating Union's (ISU) rules that permanently ban skaters from certain 
competitions if they take part in events not approved by the ISU. The Commission considers 
that ISU rules may create disproportionate and unjustified obstacles for companies not linked 
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to the ISU that want to organise alternative ice-skating events, which would prevent them 
from entering the market or driving them out of business.  
Antitrust enforcement in technology markets 
The Commission's enforcement action in technology markets focused on cases where 
dominant companies may have used their position in the market to restrict competition in an 
anti-competitive manner. Taking action against such conduct helps to keep markets 
competitive, and therefore to maintain incentives to innovate.  
Search engines are of central importance to a well-functioning Internet. In April, the 
Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Google
134
 alleging that the company had 
abused a dominant position in the markets for general internet search services by 
systematically favouring its own comparison shopping product in its general search results 
pages. The Commission continues to investigate Google's conduct with regard to other 
specialised search services as well as: (i) the copying of third-party content for use in 
Google's own specialised search services; (ii) exclusivity agreements with publishers for 
search advertising; and (iii) restrictions on the portability and management of search 
advertising campaigns across search advertising platforms. 
Access to the internet increasingly takes place through mobile devices, including smartphones 
and tablets135. A lack of competition for the supply of hardware and software for those devices 
could have important effects in terms of continued innovation. Therefore, in April, the 
Commission opened formal proceedings to examine in-depth Google's conduct as regards the 
mobile operating system, Android. The investigation is focusing on whether Google has 
breached EU antitrust rules by hindering the development and market access of rival mobile 
operating systems, applications and services, to the detriment of consumers and developers of 
innovative services and products. 
In the area of baseband chipsets, which process the core communication functions in 
smartphones, tablets and other mobile broadband devices, the Commission opened formal 
proceedings in July, to examine in-depth Qualcomm's conduct in two regards: (1) financial 
incentives to a major smartphone and table manufacturer on condition that it exclusively uses 
Qualcomm baseband chipsets in its smartphones and tablets; and (2) whether Qualcomm 
engaged in "predatory pricing" by charging prices below costs with a view to forcing its 
competition out of the market. Statements of Objections were sent to the company on 8 
December
136
. 
ICT and media in the context of the Merger Regulation 
The Commission's merger review activities ensure that mergers do not result in less 
competition. By safeguarding competition, merger review in turn contributes to maintaining 
an environment conducive to innovation and investments. 
2015 saw significant merger activity in the EU's telecommunications sector.  
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In April, the Commission conditionally cleared the merger between Altice and PT Portugal
137
. 
Altice operated via two subsidiaries in Portugal, Cabovisão and ONI. Cabovisão provided 
pay-tv, fixed internet access and fixed telephony services essentially to residential customers. 
ONI provided services to business customers, including fixed telecommunication services, in 
particular voice, data and internet access services as well as IT services. PT Portugal, a 
telecommunications and multimedia operator with activities extending across all 
telecommunications segments in Portugal, offered fixed, mobile voice and data services; 
broadband internet access services and pay-tv  services to residential customers. PT Portugal's 
offer for business customers included fixed and mobile voice services data services and IT 
services, comprising data centre solutions, virtualisation services, cloud, business outsourcing 
process and other additional value-added services. The Commission was concerned that the 
merger, as initially notified, would have reduced competition in a number of 
telecommunications markets in Portugal and that the merger would have removed a strong 
competitor from these markets, with the risk of leading to higher prices and less competition 
in Portugal. To remove these concerns, Altice offered to sell its Portuguese subsidiaries 
Cabovisão and ONI. These clear-cut commitments completely removed the overlap between 
the activities of Altice and PT Portugal within Portugal and ultimately the merger was cleared 
by the Commission. 
In May, the Commission conditionally cleared the merger between Orange and Jazztel, two of 
Spain's four providers of nationwide fixed telephony and internet access
138
. The two 
companies had been the most dynamic fixed internet providers in Spain in recent years and 
both were investing in their own high-speed Fibre-To-The-Home (FTTH) network. The 
Commission was concerned that the merger would reduce competition in the market for fixed 
internet access because the competitive constraints which Orange and Jazztel exerted on each 
other would be lost. Ultimately, the merger was cleared based on remedies that ensured the 
entry of a new nationwide player, able to replicate Jazztel's competitive pressure.  
The Commission reviewed the proposed merger of the Danish businesses of Telenor and 
TeliaSonera
139
. The merger would have combined the second and third largest operators in the 
Danish mobile retail market, leading to the creation of the largest mobile player both in terms 
of revenue and subscribers. The Commission had concerns that the merger would have led to 
higher prices, loss of innovative offers and lower quality. The remedies submitted by the 
parties to the transaction fell short of addressing these concerns. However, before any 
decision was taken, the parties abandoned the transaction. 
The Commission is reviewing the merger between Liberty Global and BASE
140
. Liberty 
Global operates a cable network in Belgium and is also a mobile virtual network operator 
(MVNO). BASE is one of Belgium's three mobile network operators. The merger therefore 
combines a mobile network operator with a fixed network operator which is also an MVNO. 
The review continues in 2016. 
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In addition, the Commission is reviewing the merger between two of the United Kingdom's 
four mobile network operators, namely Hutchison and Telefónica UK
141
. In October 2015, it 
opened an in-depth investigation into the transaction, based on concerns that the merger could 
lead to higher prices, less choice and reduced innovation. The review continues in 2016. 
In the IT sector, the Commission dealt with a series of multi-billion mergers in the 
semiconductor industry. In September, it cleared NXP's acquisition of Freescale, subject to 
remedies aimed at preserving competition in the market for radio frequency power 
transistors
142
. These transistors are used in the base stations of mobile networks and are used 
to make radio frequency signals more powerful. Other transactions in the semiconductor 
sector were unconditionally cleared since they did not raise competition concerns. This was 
the case for Intel's acquisition of Altera143, cleared in October, and Avago Technologies' 
acquisition of United States chipmaker Broadcom
144
, cleared in November. 
In the media sector, the Commission conditionally cleared the acquisition by Liberty Global 
of a stake in De Vijver Media145, a Belgian TV broadcasting and production company in 
February. The commitments ensure that TV distributors that compete with Liberty Global's 
Belgian operation Telenet will still have access to the two TV channels broadcast by De 
Vijver Media. The commitments can be invoked not only by existing players but also by new 
players who want to offer TV services to consumers in novel ways. In June, the Commission 
conditionally approved the creation of a joint venture for cross-border licensing of online 
music146, set up by three music collecting societies from the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Germany. The joint venture will allow online music platforms such as Spotify and iTunes to 
obtain a single music licence for the entire EU.  
State aid enforcement in ICT and media 
The achievement of the Digital Agenda targets for broadband coverage, despite substantial 
progress, represents a significant challenge, in particular for the second objective
147
. 
According to the Commission's analysis on the funding gap to meet the EU broadband targets 
by 2020, in the most optimistic scenario, the coverage target of 30 Megabits per second 
(Mbps) for all European households will be reached only if and additional EUR 34 billion are 
invested
148
. The further investment to reach the take-up target (half of the European 
households with 100 Mbps subscription) is estimated at EUR 92.4 billion. 
The broadband sector is highly commercial and most of the financing for the upgrade and 
deployment of next-generation networks comes from the private sector. State aid control 
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seeks to ensure that publicly funded networks do not crowd out private investments. Private 
companies tend to invest mostly in urban, highly populated areas which can assure rapid 
return on investment. As a result, in certain areas - in particular rural - public funds are needed 
to ensure investment supporting the deployment of broadband networks, within the broader 
objectives of inclusion and economic development. State involvement (via State aid and 
regulation) has been very important in this regard
149 
and will continue to be needed in the 
coming years.  
With a view to stimulating overall investment in next-generation access (NGA) infrastructure 
and ensure that customers benefit from State intervention, where a broadband infrastructure is 
built using State aid, operators must fulfil a number of conditions which include measures to 
ensure third parties' effective wholesale access to the subsidised broadband infrastructure as 
specified in the Broadband State Aid Guidelines
150
 This helps to ensure that the positive 
effects of the aid measure outweigh its potential negative effects and minimises any distortive 
effect. 
An example of a case where these principles have been enforced is the NGA Germany case. 
In 2015, the Commission approved Germany's federal State aid scheme for NGA 
deployment
151
. The EUR 3 billion plan aims to fill the gaps in NGA coverage, achieving full 
coverage with connection speeds of preferably 50 Mbps (but at least 30 Mbps). To support the 
goals of the programme, Germany intends to employ "vectoring" technology, which can boost 
connection speeds for subscribers in a very cost-efficient way, while also inhibiting open 
access and multi-operator competition at the same. Therefore the Commission approved the 
scheme on the condition that vectoring would only be deployed once Germany demonstrated 
to the Commission a way (either regulatory or technological) to remedy its anti-competitive 
effect.  
The principle of technological neutrality is important in various areas including platforms for 
transmission of television signals. In November, the General Court dismissed several actions 
for annulment of a Commission decision on the deployment of digital terrestrial television in 
remote and less urbanised areas of Spain
152
. The General Court concluded that public funding 
granted by Spain to facilitate the transition from analogue to digital television in remote and 
less urbanised areas provided a selective advantage to terrestrial platform operators over 
competitors using other transmission technologies, in breach of EU State aid rules. Moreover, 
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the General Court confirmed that the Commission was correct in holding that the aid was 
incompatible with the single market, in particular as it did not respect the principle of 
technological neutrality. These judgments confirm the Commission's analysis of how Member 
States can support the transmission of TV coverage in line with EU law in a technologically 
neutral way. 
 3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Overview of the key challenges in the sector 
Financial services represent about 5 % of the EU's GDP but, more importantly, they play an 
essential role in providing access to finance for the real economy. In 2015, the situation of 
financial markets improved as the situation of the banks is normalising in several Member 
States, with banks returning to decent profitability levels and being able to raise new private 
capital when needed. 
Due to its systemic importance, the Commission has remained very active in the financial 
services sector also in 2015. It continued to enforce State aid rules for the financial sector 
with the aim of ensuring that aided financial institutions restructure adequately or exit the 
market in an orderly way, and limiting competition distortions from State aid within the 
internal market, while limiting the use of taxpayers' money to the minimum necessary. At the 
same time, the Commission continued its role in merger control as well as in antitrust 
enforcement, investigating anti-competitive behaviours in the area of financial services. 
Since its launch in June 2012, completing the Banking Union remains a key priority on the 
EU agenda
153
. Progress continued in 2015: 
 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) entered into force on 1 January 
2015
154
. It sets out the resolution rules for banks and large investment firms in all Member 
States and aims to better protect taxpayers from having to bail out banks in distress. The 
Member States had to transpose the directive into national law by 31 December 2014. 17 
Member States have complied with this deadline. On 28 May, the European Commission 
issued a reasoned opinion to request the full implementation of the directive by the 
remaining 11 Member States
155
. 
 The members of the Single Resolution Board156 were appointed by the Council on 19 
December 2014 and took up their posts in March 2015. As of 2016, the Single Resolution 
Board will be the resolution authority for the significant and cross-border banking groups 
established within participating Member States in the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). It will enable the formulation of resolutions plans for the banks within their 
responsibility, and calculate the annual contributions of all institutions authorised in the 
Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the SRM. 
In the context of the SRM it will work in close cooperation with the national resolution 
authorities. 
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 In November, the Commission put forward a proposal for a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS)
157
, aiming to provide a stronger and more uniform degree of insurance 
cover for all retail depositors in the banking union. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and investment in payments 
The European payments market is developing rapidly with lots of innovation and investments; 
there were 26 deals raising USD 417.9 million in venture capital up to September 2014, an 
increase that surpassed the dot-com levels and showed a faster pace in Europe than 
worldwide.  
2015 has been an important year for this market, with the adoption and entry into force of a 
legislative "payment package". These new rules will profoundly change the way payment 
providers can operate in the EU.  
In April, the Interchange Fee Regulation was adopted. It introduced, as of 9 December, EEA 
wide harmonised caps on inter-bank fees for the most-used credit and debit cards
158
. The 
Regulation will generate substantial savings for retailers and consumers, as it is expected to 
reduce hidden fees on card payments by EUR 6 billion annually. It will also make business 
practices fairer and more transparent and allow competition to be more effective
159
.  
2015 also saw the publication of the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD II)
160
. This 
Directive will allow regulated access to the internet payments market by non-banks to the 
benefit of retailers and consumers
161
. 
In most Member States credit cards are the main means of internet payment. But card 
payments over the internet are cumbersome, expensive to merchants (with traditionally very 
high interchange fees for card transactions over the internet) and insecure with high levels of 
fraud
162
. Moreover, only 60 % of EU citizens possess such cards. The PSD II will open the 
market for (bank-owned and non-bank owned) regulated third-party players who offer 
alternative means of internet payments (e.g. through credit transfers via the consumer's bank's 
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website, including most importantly the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) Credit Transfer 
system).  
The PSD II will also enhance the security of internet payments in general. It will open the 
market to a whole range of other secure and efficient services building on the consumer's 
bank account, including account information services (allowing consumers to keep track on 
their mobile phone of their spending on different bank accounts) and payment instrument 
issuers (who are third parties who can issue cards and other payment instruments to 
consumers). Some of these services are already on the market and many more are expected 
after the transitional period of two years. 
The "payment package" therefore opens the door for innovation and investment in the 
payments sector.  
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial services sector 
In 2015, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations in the financial sector, one of 
the Commission's priority areas to achieve a fairer and more integrated internal market.  
In July, a Statement of Objections was sent to MasterCard
163
 in the proceedings against its 
interchange fees for transactions in the EEA made with cards issued outside the EEA ("inter-
regional transactions") and rules hindering cross-border acquiring, which allegedly artificially 
segments the internal market and prevents the usual competitive process in acquiring. The 
proceedings against Visa Inc. and Visa International as regards their fees for inter-regional 
transactions also continue
164
. The inter-regional interchange fees of Visa and MasterCard 
together represent about EUR 1 billion each year. The Commission is concerned that they 
increase prices for EEA retailers and may in turn lead to higher prices for products and 
services for all consumers. Linked to these proceedings, the Commission had commissioned a 
detailed study into the cost for merchants of receiving payments by card and by cash. This 
was carried out by Deloitte. Initial results were published in 2014 about the costs for the 
merchants that took part in the study. A final report was published in March
165
 estimating 
these costs for merchants in the whole of the EU.  
The investigative efforts into the credit default swaps (CDS) market continued throughout 
2015. On 4 December, the Commission decided to partially close the proceedings against all 
banks involved in the investigation. The investigation continued against the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and data provider Markit. 
YIRD (ICAP) 
On 4 February, the Commission fined the UK-based broker ICAP EUR 14,96 million for facilitating six cartels 
in the sector of Yen interest rate derivatives between 2007 and 2010. In this sector, the Commission had already 
uncovered several distinct bilateral infringements and imposed fines on the banks UBS, RBS, Deutsche Bank, 
Citigroup, JPMorgan and on the broker RP Martin in December 2013.  
These companies had admitted their involvement in one or more cartels in the YIRD sector, which allowed the 
Commission to settle the case with them. ICAP chose not to settle the case and proceedings continued against it 
under the normal procedure. The investigation uncovered that ICAP had facilitated six out of the seven cartels in 
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the YIRD sector through various actions that contributed to the anti-competitive objectives pursued by the 
cartelists and in particular by: disseminating misleading information to certain JPY Libor panel banks which 
were portrayed as "predictions" or "expectations" of where the JPY LIBOR rates would be set. This misleading 
information was aimed at influencing certain panel banks (which were not participating in these infringements) 
to submit JPY LIBOR rates in line with the adjusted "predictions" or "expectations"; using its contacts with 
several JPY LIBOR panel banks (which were not participating in the infringements) with the aim of influencing 
their JPY LIBOR submissions; and serving as a communications channel between a trader of Citigroup and a 
trader of RBS and thereby enabling the anti-competitive practices between them. 
Review of the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation  
The Commission continued in 2015 with the Impact Assessment procedure for the review of the 
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 267/2010 (IBER)
166
. It assessed the replies to 
targeted questionnaires
167
 received following the public consultation in 2014 and took further 
stakeholder contacts. Preparatory steps were taken for the Report
168
 on the functioning and 
future of the regulation, which has to be submitted to Parliament and Council by March 2016. 
To gain additional input for the forthcoming Impact Assessment the Commission commissioned 
two studies on issues regarding the functioning of the regulation raised by stakeholders in the 
context of the consultation process. The studies will be undertaken in the first half of 2016. 
Merger investigations in the financial sector 
The Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the financial services sector do 
not lead to market distortions. The Commission assessed several mergers in the banking, 
insurance and capital markets sectors. For example, the acquisition of Instituto Centrale delle 
Banche Popolari Italiane by Advent International and Bain Capital, involving markets related 
to payment cards
169
 or the acquisition by Aviva of Friends Life and Tenet which affected the 
United Kingdom life insurance market
170
. As these transactions did not raise competition 
concerns, they were cleared in the first phase investigation and without the need for remedial 
action to be ordered. 
State aid investigations in the financial sector 
The special EU State aid crisis rules, first adopted in 2008 and amended in 2010 and 
2011, were restructured in the Banking Communication171 that was adopted on 1 
August 2013. Those rules, in line with the BRRD, allow State aid control to continue to 
ensure a consistent policy response to the financial crisis throughout the EU. They also 
played an important role in limiting distortions of competition in the internal market. 
Furthermore, they contribute to the restoration of confidence in the European financial 
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sector so that it can again provide affordable lending to the real economy, including 
SMEs, and support economic growth. 
Until 31 December, the Commission has analysed 117 banks, or around one quarter of 
Europe's banking sector by assets, under the special crisis rules. Of those banks, 61 were 
restructured and 41 were orderly liquidated. As of 31 December, one case is still 
pending. 
It is important to note that only a part of approved State aid to the financial sector has 
actually been used. In particular, only around a third of the guarantees approved by the 
Commission were eventually necessary to be provided to banks by the respective 
Member States.  
In the period of 2008 until 2014, the volume of aid in the form of capital (i.e. 
recapitalisations and asset relief measures) amounted to EUR 617 billion (4.4 % of EU 
2014 GDP). More specifically, recapitalisations totalled EUR 432 billion (3.1 % of EU 
GDP), whilst asset relief measures amounted to EUR 185 billion (1.3 % of EU GDP). 
The volume of guarantees and other liquidity support reached its peak in 2009, with the 
outstanding amount of EUR 906 billion (7.4 % of EU 2009 GDP). Since then the crisis has 
gradually receded in many Member States, and the outstanding amount of liquidity 
support dropped to EUR 215 billion (1.5 % of EU 2014 GDP) in 2014. That year the 
outstanding amount of guarantees was EUR 186 billion, whilst other outstanding 
liquidity measures amounted to EUR 28 billion (0.2 % of EU GDP). 
 
State aid rules ensure that banks remunerate Member States for aid and that this aid is 
repaid. For aid in the form of capital, Member States have received EUR 15 billion in 
dividends and other remuneration by end-2014. During the same period, Member States 
have received EUR 40 billion in guarantee fees, compared to EUR 4 billion of guarantees 
actually called. For liquidity support in the form of loans, Member States had received 
EUR 68 billion in interest by end-2014. 
Data on aid repayments in 2015 will include a repayment by KBC in Belgium and partial 
re-privatisations of such banks as Deutsche Pfandbriefbank in Germany, ABN Amro in 
the Netherlands, as well as Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland in the United Kingdom 
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and if those Member States recouped some of the funds provided during the financial 
crisis. 
Non-performing loans (NLP) 
A dominant topic in the Commission's discussions with Member States is the management of non-performing 
loans (NPLs). As a result of the economic recession or bursting of real estate bubbles, many banks throughout 
Europe have large volumes of NPLs on their books. However, the legal framework for dealing with these is very 
different in each Member State. In some Member States, strong creditor protection prevents banks from 
managing their NPL effectively, e.g. by seizing collateral. Consequently, some national administrations have 
tried to devise other ways to reduce the burden of NPL on their banks' balance sheets so that these banks can 
better fulfil their role of lenders to the real economy. Currently, the Commission is discussing this topic with 
Italy and Hungary. Both States have decided to set up asset management companies (AMC) which should take 
over NPL from existing banks. While discussions on Italy's plans are still ongoing, Hungary has already begun 
to set up an AMC in 2014. 
In general, AMC give rise to a number of questions from a State aid perspective. The most important question is 
at what price the transfer of an NPL from a bank to a State-funded AMC takes place. In principle, a transfer at 
market value does, in all likelihood, not entail State aid. However, if the transfer is conducted at a price above 
the market value of the NPL, the transferring bank receives State aid amounting to the difference between the 
market value of the loan and the transfer price.  
It is important to highlight that this selective economic advantage to the bank in question comes at the expense of 
the taxpayer, who is buying the defaulted loans at a price considered by the private investors to be too high 
compared to the risk of losses. Under State aid rules, such type of aid has to be strictly limited to distressed 
banks and given only under the condition that the banks in question are restructured. In other words, under State 
aid rules, it is not allowed that, when creditors default on their loans, the banks are able to sell these loans to the 
State at inflated prices without having to restructure. Consequently, the Commission will keep monitoring 
Member States' plans for AMC closely in order to protect the European taxpayers from unnecessary burdens and 
to avoid undue advantages to banks. No decisions have been taken on AMC in 2015. 
On 9 April, the Commission approved under State aid rules the restructuring plan of 
Permanent TSB
172
. The third-largest domestically owned Irish bank received a significant 
capital injection from the Irish State in 2011 and benefited from various asset relief measures 
and guarantee schemes. These measures had been temporarily approved by the Commission 
subject to the submission of a restructuring plan. The initial plan submitted by Ireland was 
subsequently adjusted and updated several times to account for changing market conditions, 
the results of the October 2014 comprehensive assessment conducted by the ECB, and 
difficulties to agree on terms to ensure the bank's long-term viability. The restructuring plan 
includes a set of commitments that Permanent TSB will respect until the end of 2018, 
including commitments to deleverage and reduce costs. 
On 2 July, the Commission took an amendment decision on Österreichische Volksbanken AG 
(ÖVAG) and the Austrian Volksbanken sector, a network of cooperative banks
173
. ÖVAG, the 
central institution of the Volksbanken sector, had already received State aid in 2009 and was 
subsequently been put under restructuring through a Commission decision
174
. In October 
2014, the ECB stress test revealed a capital shortfall of EUR 865 million for the Volksbanken 
sector including ÖVAG. To make up for the shortfall the bank and the Austrian authorities 
proposed to transfer ÖVAG's functions as a central institution to another Volksbank and to 
put ÖVAG itself in wind-down. The Commission agreed to this plan on condition that the 
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Volksbanken sector repays EUR 300 million to the Austrian State which Austria had given to 
ÖVAG as part of an injection of EUR 1 billion in participation capital in 2009. Previously, the 
Austrian State had already lost EUR 700 million of this sum due to ÖVAG's continued loss-
making. 
On 22 November, the Commission found the resolution plans for four small Italian banks
175
 
to be in line with State aid rules
176
. The four institutions constitute around 1 % of the Italian 
banking sector. All of them had already been placed under special administration between 
2013 and 2015. Under the decisions a bridge bank will be created for each bank. These bridge 
banks are to be sold in a profit-maximising way at a later stage. The Italian national resolution 
fund will provide EUR 3.6 billion to the bridge banks, minimising the need for State aid and 
consequently the burden for the Italian taxpayer. On 23 December, the Commission found 
that the support granted by the Italian mandatory deposit guarantee scheme to Banca Tercas, a 
small Italian bank with a market share of about 0.1 % of total banking assets in Italy, 
constitutes incompatible State aid
177
. This decision followed the opening of an in-depth probe 
into the support measures in February 2015. The decision exemplifies the Commission's 
continued vigilance regarding State aid rules in the European financial sector – including the 
requirement that State aid must be kept to the necessary minimum.  
The specific situation of Programme Countries 
In Greece, the situation of the banking sector deteriorated dramatically over the first half of 
2015 amid uncertainties about the financing of the Greek State, which eventually led to a new 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) support programme for Greece agreed in August 2015. 
In that context, the European Central Bank's Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) carried 
out a comprehensive assessment of the four systemic Greek banks, to ensure that they are 
adequately capitalised. This revealed - on 31 October - large capital shortfalls. The banks 
aimed to cover their capital needs from private sources (existing creditors, voluntary exchange 
of their bonds for new shares, and new investors). Two of the banks succeeded in doing so 
fully, while the other two raised significant amounts of private capital and received capital 
injections from the State for the difference. All of them benefited from an aid measure in the 
form of a Hellenic Financial Stability Fund commitment to cover any capital needs not 
covered from private sources. The Commission found the aid measure provided by the Fund 
and the capital injections, to be in line with State aid rules, on the basis of amended 
restructuring plans submitted for the banks, which included new restructuring measures and 
commitments, proportional to the amount of aid received by each of the banks. 
In Cyprus, the Single Supervisory Mechanism concluded two assessments with respect to the 
Cypriot Central Cooperative Banks (CCB) in 2015. The first, a Supervisory Review 
Evaluation Process (SREP), led to a decision that CCB must at all times have an overall 
capital ratio equal in quality to Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1). The second assessment was 
related to an on-site inspection that identified a shortfall in provisioning. As a result of both 
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reviews, the CCB needed additional capital. Since their legal structure did not allow them to 
raise the new capital from private sources, the Commission received a request for new State 
aid. The new capital injection was approved subject to significant additional restructuring of 
the CCB. Further operational integration was demanded, including further centralisation of 
employees to allow for their easier redeployment and the governance structure of the group 
was further simplified as well as the centralisation of ownership and control of physical 
assets. In order to restore market access of the CCB, a progressive divestment by the State has 
been demanded to start before the end of the restructuring period – before 2018. 
In May, Portugal successfully exited a financial assistance programme, during which a large 
part of the banking sector had been subject to restructuring decisions under State aid rules. 
State aid control in the financial sector continues to play a relevant role in the post-
programme context.  
In December, the Commission took decisions on two Portuguese banks, Novo Banco and 
Banif. Novo Banco, which was established following the resolution of BES in August 
2014
178
, had to be sold by August 2016 in a transaction that was to be approved by the 
Commission. A sales process run in 2015 did not find a buyer. At the same time, the 
European Central Bank's Single Supervisory Mechanism carried out a comprehensive 
assessment of the bank, revealing on 14 November a shortfall of EUR 1.4 billion in the 
adverse stress test scenario, adding to the complexity of the bank's situation. In December, the 
Commission adopted a decision
179
, amending the BES resolution, postponing the deadline to 
sell and declaring the prolongation of existing Government Guarantee Bank Bonds to be 
compatible, based on a strengthened set of commitments by the Portuguese authorities and an 
increased focus by Novo Banco on its core activities. The Commission did not approve any 
other measures for Novo Banco.  
In December, the Commission also adopted a decision
180
 approving the resolution of Banif, 
through the sale of assets to Banco Santander Totta and a transfer of assets to an asset 
management vehicle (Oitante). The resolution strategy was chosen by the Portuguese 
authorities, who notified it to the Commission. The transfer of assets to the asset management 
vehicle was only approved on a temporary basis under the State aid framework, a final 
decision is expected in 2016.  
In the case of Banif, on 24 July the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess 
whether EUR 1.1 billion of State aid, granted by Portugal to the bank in January 2013 under a 
temporary Commission approval
181
, was compatible with EU State aid rules. Several 
amended versions of the restructuring plan for Banif had been submitted to the Commission 
since the 2013 rescue decision. However, the opening of the investigation was necessary 
because of the doubts about the viability of the bank and on the measures proposed to ensure 
adequate burden sharing and limitation of competition distortions. On 21 December, the 
Commission approved a series of State aid measures by Portugal amounting to up to EUR 3 
billion to put Banif into resolution. The viable parts of Banif were sold to Santander Totta. 
                                                          
178
 Case SA.39250 Resolution of Banco Espírito Santo, Commission decision of 3 August 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39250  
179
 Case SA.43976 Amendment to the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo, Commission decision of 19 December 
2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_43976  
180
 Case SA.43977 Resolution of Banif – Banco Internacional do Funchal SA, Commission decision of 21 
December 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_43977 
181
 Case SA.34662 Rentipar/BANIF – Rescue decision – PT, Commission decision of 21 January 2013 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_34662 
 56 
The rest of the bank will be wound down and cease to compete on the market. The State 
support therefore preserves financial stability and preserves the lending capacity to the 
Madera region but without artificially keeping alive non-viable activities. Hence the 
Commission concluded that this aid does not lead to undue distortions of competition and is 
compatible with the internal market.  
 4. TAXATION AND STATE AID 
Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance and fiscal aid 
The focus the Commission has put on fighting tax evasion and tax avoidance echoes the 
priorities set by President Juncker upon taking office in November 2014, and is also 
underscored in Commissioner Vestager's Mission Letter. This is also in line with efforts at 
international level, namely by the OECD, to tackle tax base erosion and profit shifting to 
better align rights to tax with economic activity
182
. State aid investigations into Member 
States' tax ruling practices, which began in 2013, before the Luxleaks revelations, are one of 
the tools the Commission has to ensure companies pay the taxes they owe in the Member 
States where they generate economic value. 
Tax evasion and avoidance can be the result of aggressive tax planning strategies, in so far as 
they shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, 
resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. Aggressive tax planning can be 
pursued by making use of preferential tax schemes, or by requesting individual tax rulings. 
They all have in common that they result in a loss of tax revenue in the Member State where 
economic value is generated but not taxed, and in Europe as a whole because the tax 
eventually paid is less than it would have been if the profits had not been shifted. 
The side effects of aggressive tax planning for the EU are particularly negative: first, it results 
in undue tax reliefs that distort competition by granting advantages only to selected 
companies; second, it entails a social equity issue, as the revenues foregone from untaxed 
multinationals need to be compensated, which normally shifts the burden to less mobile 
income of SMEs and labour; third, from the perspective of the dislocation of activities, 
aggressive tax planning can present a threat to the sustainable growth of the internal market if 
some Member States were to offer exit points for European profits of multinationals in 
exchange for creating jobs on their territory and a limited tax payment. 
Both collecting taxes and combating tax evasion are normally competences of the Member 
States. However, even in this area where the Member States enjoy fiscal autonomy, any 
national tax measures adopted have to comply with internal market rules and, amongst others, 
abide by competition law
183
. 
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Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 
Since 2013, the Commission has been looking into tax planning practices via its dedicated 
Task Force. 
Throughout 2014 and 2015, the Commission has continued to gather information on tax 
planning practices. At an initial stage, relevant information was requested from certain 
Member States where allegations of preferential treatment through tax rulings had been drawn 
to the Commission's attention, notably Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands. In addition 
to the above, requests for information on tax planning practices were sent to Cyprus, Malta 
and the United Kingdom.  
In December 2014
184
, the Commission extended its State aid enquiry to include all Member 
States. The enquiry is aimed at clarifying allegations that tax rulings may constitute State aid 
and to allow the Commission to take an informed view of the practices of all Member States. 
On the basis of the information received, in June, the Commission requested 15 Member 
States to provide a substantial number of individual tax rulings
185
. Requesting these tax 
rulings does not prejudge whether this will lead to individual State aid investigations 
concerning the recipients of these tax rulings. 
Overall, in the context of the rulings enquiry, Member States have shown good cooperation, 
except for, initially, Estonia and Poland. Therefore, in June, the Commission adopted two 
information injunctions ordering Estonia and Poland to deliver the information the 
Commission needs to assess whether certain tax practices favour certain companies, in breach 
of State aid rules. After the injunctions, the Member States submitted the requested 
information. 
Specific cases 
In 2014, the Commission opened four formal investigations where it raised concerns that tax 
rulings may entail State aid issues. These investigations concern rulings for Apple in 
Ireland
186
, Starbucks in the Netherlands, Fiat Finance & Trade in Luxembourg, and Amazon 
in Luxembourg
187
. Two of these cases were concluded on 21 October with negative decisions 
with recovery
188
. 
Both of those decisions find that by issuing tax rulings in favour of integrated group 
companies that endorse a method allowing those companies to determine their taxable profit 
in a manner that deviates from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome, the 
Member States in question confer a selective advantage on those companies and the 
multinational corporate groups to which they belong. That is because those tax rulings allow 
those group companies to reduce their taxable profit and thus their tax liability under the 
                                                          
184
 For further information see IP/14/2742 of 17 December 2014 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-2742_en.htm  
185
 For further information see IP/15/5140 of 8 June 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5140_en.htm  
186
 Case SA.38373 Alleged aid to Apple, Commission decision of 11 June 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38373  
187
 Case SA.38944 Alleged aid to Amazon, Commission decision of 7 October 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38944  
188
 For further information see IP/15/5880 of 21 October 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5880_en.htm  
 58 
ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profits in the Member State concerned, as compared to 
independent standalone companies, whose taxable profits are the result of prices negotiated at 
arm's-length and thus determined by the market. That the method for determining an 
integrated group company's taxable profit for corporate taxation purposes should comply with 
this "arm's-length" principle flows from Article 107(1) TFEU, as interpreted by the case law 
of the Union Courts
189
.  
Luxembourg - Fiat Finance and Trade (FFT) 
One of the decisions adopted by the Commission in 2015
190 
concerns the intra-group treasury 
company of Fiat Chrysler Automobile. Its Luxembourg subsidiary Fiat Finance and Trade 
(FFT) provides financial services, such as intra-group loans, to other Fiat group car 
companies in Europe, excluding Italy. The tax ruling issued by Luxembourg to that company 
endorsed an artificial and extremely complex transfer pricing methodology that the 
Commission did not find appropriate for determining that company's taxable profits in manner 
that reliably reflects market conditions. As a result, FFT's tax base was significantly reduced 
as compared to independent standalone companies in a comparable factual and legal situation.  
The Commission concluded that because FFT's activities can (as also claimed by the company 
and Luxembourg) be compared to those of a bank, the taxable profits of FFT could in order to 
be at arm's length, be determined in a similar way as for a bank, which means a calculation of 
return on capital deployed by the company for its financing activities. This requires, as a 
matter of principle that if the taxable profits are calculated based on capital, the level of 
capitalisation in the company has to be adequate compared to financial industry standards. 
Additionally, the remuneration applied has to correspond to market conditions. The 
Commission's assessment showed that, in the case of FFT, if the estimations of capital and 
remuneration applied had corresponded to market conditions, the taxable profits declared in 
Luxembourg would have been 20 times higher. 
The Netherlands - Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (Starbucks Manufacturing) 
The other decision adopted by the Commission in 2015191 concerns a Dutch-based subsidiary 
of the Starbucks Corporation. The Dutch subsidiary Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV 
(Starbucks Manufacturing) is the only coffee roasting company of the Starbucks group in 
Europe. It sells and distributes roasted coffee and coffee-related products (e.g. cups, pastries, 
etc.) to Starbucks outlets in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.  
A tax ruling issued by the Dutch tax authorities in 2008 significantly lowered Starbucks 
Manufacturing's tax base as compared to its accounting profit. The core of the Commission's 
decision concerned the payment of a substantial royalty fee to another Starbuck's group 
subsidiary based in the United Kingdom for the use of coffee-roasting IP and know-how, 
which is not liable for corporate tax in either the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. 
Moreover, the company also paid an inflated price for green coffee beans to a Switzerland-
based Starbucks group company.  
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The Commission's investigation established that the tax ruling endorsed a transfer pricing 
methodology that did not produce a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome, since 
it did not properly examine or price the royalty paid by Starbucks Manufacturing for the 
coffee-roasting IP and know-how to a Starbucks subsidiary in the United Kingdom and the 
price paid by Starbucks Manufacturing for green coffee beans to a Starbucks subsidiary in 
Switzerland. The Commission further found that the royalty fee in question cannot be justified 
since it did not reflect a reliable approximation of a market price. In particular, the 
Commission noted that Starbucks does not charge a royalty for the use of its coffee-roasting 
IP and know-how when that IP is licensed to third parties that do not exploit the finished 
product on the market. In addition, the Commission found that certain competitors of 
Starbucks do not charge a royalty for the use of their coffee-roasting IP and know-how when 
this is licensed to a coffee roasting toll manufacturer. The Commission therefore concluded 
that, by allowing Starbucks Manufacturing as a result of the tax ruling to shift a considerable 
portion of its accounting profit to another Starbucks group entity in the guise of a royalty 
which was not justified by the market, the Dutch tax authorities conferred a selective 
advantage upon that company in the form of a reduction of its taxable profit and thus its 
corporate income tax liability under the ordinary rules of corporate taxation in the 
Netherlands as compared to independent companies whose taxable profits are the result of 
prices negotiated at arm's-length and thus determined by the market. In the case of Starbucks 
Manufacturing, however, the existence and level of the royalty means that a large part of its 
taxable profits are unduly shifted out of the country. In addition, the Commission's 
investigation found that Starbucks Manufacturing's tax base was also unduly reduced by the 
inflated price it pays for green coffee beans to a Starbuck's subsidiary based in Switzerland. 
The investigation concluded that by the tax ruling issued in 2008, the Netherlands gave a 
selective advantage to Starbucks Manufacturing, which has unduly reduced Starbucks 
Manufacturing's tax burden since 2008 by EUR 20 - EUR 30 million.  
The two afore-mentioned decisions do not question the practice of issuing tax rulings as such, 
in so far as they are used to obtain clarity on how corporate tax will be calculated or on the 
use of special tax provisions. The two decisions expose two tax rulings endorsing artificial 
and unnecessarily complex transfer pricing methods to establish taxable profits for the 
companies in question, which did not reflect economic reality and in no way corresponded to 
market conditions. Member States have to scrutinise requests for tax rulings and not accept 
the establishment of transfer prices with no economic justification and which unduly shift 
profits to reduce the taxes paid by companies in their jurisdictions. Otherwise the 
beneficiaries of the ruling will obtain an unfair competitive advantage over other companies 
(in particular independent stand-alone companies, typically SMEs) that are taxed on their 
actually recorded profits which are determined by prices negotiated at arm's length on the 
market for the goods and services they use. 
Belgian excess profit system 
In February, the Commission launched an in-depth investigation into the Belgian excess profit 
system
192
. The scheme provides certain Belgian entities that are part of a multinational group 
with a reduction of their tax base. The tax base reduction concerns a part of an entity's actually 
recorded profit which exceeds the alleged hypothetical average profit of a stand-alone entity 
(i.e. not part of a group) deemed to be comparable. Belgium deems that part of the profit 
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"excess profit". This unilateral downward adjustment of the tax base, is claimed to be granted to 
prevent double taxation, but it applies irrespective of any risk of double taxation. The benefits 
of the scheme are available subject to an advance ruling issued by a special ruling commission. 
On 11 January 2016, the Commission adopted a negative decision with recovery
193
, concluding 
that selective tax advantages granted by Belgium under its "excess profit" tax scheme are illegal 
under EU State aid rules. The scheme has benefited at least 35 multinationals mainly from the 
EU, who must now return unpaid taxes to Belgium. 
Luxembourg - McDonald's  
Finally, on 3 December the Commission opened a formal probe into Luxembourg's tax 
treatment of McDonald's
194
. Its preliminary view is that a tax ruling granted by Luxembourg 
may have granted McDonald's an advantageous tax treatment in breach of EU State aid rules. In 
particular, the Commission will assess whether Luxembourg authorities selectively derogated 
from the provisions of their national tax law and the Luxembourg-United States Double 
Taxation Treaty and thereby gave McDonald's an advantage not available to other companies in 
a comparable factual and legal situation. 
State aid investigation of sector specific tax issues - investigation into three Hungarian 
schemes with progressive tax rates 
In 2014, Hungary introduced (1) a tax on the turnover derived from the publication of 
advertisements in the media (advertisement tax); (2) a tax on the annual turnover derived from 
the production and trade of tobacco products, and (3) widened an existing tax on the annual 
turnover of food chain operators, to include retail stores selling items of daily consumption. 
These three turnover tax measures had progressive rates depending on annual turnover, and 
placed companies with low turnover in an advantaged position compared to others.  
In March and July, the Commission launched formal investigations
195
 into these measures, 
(combined with suspension injunctions), considering the progressivity of the tax rates grants a 
selective advantage to undertakings with low turnover and constitutes State aid, which does not 
appear compatible with the internal market. In reaction, on all three measures Hungary signalled 
its willingness to abolish the progressive elements and either abolish the measures or transform 
them into flat-rate measures compatible with the State aid rules. 
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5. BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Manufacturing is key to the European economy, though it contributes slightly less in terms of 
GDP than it has in the past
196
. However, the economic importance of industrial activity is much 
greater than bare GDP figures may suggest. Industry accounts for over 80 % of Europe's exports 
and 80 % of private research and innovation. Nearly one in four private-sector jobs are in 
manufacturing, while each additional manufacturing job creates up to two jobs in other 
sectors
197
.  
Recognising the central importance of industry for boosting competitiveness and sustainable 
growth in Europe, the Commission has signalled its commitment to industrial modernisation 
and promoting a competitive framework for EU industry through investments in innovation, 
resource efficiency, new technologies, skills and access to finance to increase the industry's 
share of EU GDP to as much as 20 % by 2020
198
. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Healthy and vigorous competition enhances the incentives for innovation, and therefore sets 
the scene for economic growth and job creation. The Commission must therefore be vigilant 
to ensure that Europe's future prospects are not harmed by anti-competitive practices which 
introduce rigidities, push prices up and reduce the competitiveness of EU companies and the 
real income of EU consumers. By maintaining a level playing field, EU competition policy 
contributes to Europe's growth agenda and underpins the international competitiveness of the 
European manufacturing sectors. 
Antitrust investigations in basic industries 
Basic manufacturing and consumer goods industries continue to represent a significant share 
of the Commission's enforcement practice. In 2015, the Commission continued its lines of 
action (including individual case work, market surveillance and advocacy) in these sectors,  
EU value-added industry requires access to basic materials at affordable prices that reflect 
international cost conditions. In 2015, the Commission actively monitored the markets for 
these inputs to ensure there is adequate access in a healthy and competitive environment. In 
particular, the Commission continued to monitor the ongoing reform of the London Metal 
Exchange rules on warehousing
199
, while also focusing on other commodities such as 
chemicals. 
Cartel investigations in basic industries 
Parking Heaters 
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On 17 June, the Commission adopted its 18
th
 settlement decision, imposing a total fine of 
more than EUR 68 million
200
 on two Germany-based undertakings, Webasto and Eberspächer 
that had coordinated prices and allocated customers with regard to fuel-operated parking 
heaters (which heat parked cars or trucks) and auxiliary heaters (which support the heating 
system of a running car or truck) between September 2001 and September 2011. The cartel 
covered supplies of parking heaters to major manufacturers of both cars and trucks across the 
EEA as well as the aftermarket sales in Germany and Austria. 
The parties formed a "basic understanding" according to which competition between them 
should primarily focus on quality and technology, rather than price. They also agreed to 
comply with the incumbent supplier principle, which meant that they would not aggressively 
pursue individual customers or specific models supplied historically by the other undertaking. 
The ultimate aim of the agreement was to generate reasonable margins by limiting price 
competition. For 10 years, Webasto and Eberspächer engaged into regular bilateral contacts, 
during which they coordinated prices and exchanged other commercially sensitive 
information.  
The investigation started with an immunity application submitted by Webasto which was 
followed by an unannounced inspection at Eberspächer's premises in July 2013. Shortly after, 
Eberspächer applied for leniency. Eberspächer benefited from a reduction of its fine under the 
2006 Leniency Notice for its cooperation as well as a further reduction of 10 % for agreeing 
to settle the case with the Commission. Webasto received full immunity for revealing the 
existence of the cartel.  
Retail Food Packaging 
On 24 June, the Commission adopted a decision
201
 against 10 companies (Linpac, Vitembal, 
Coopbox, Sirap-Gema, Huhtamäki, Silver Plastics, Nespak, Magic Pack, Ovarpack and 
Propack) for their participation in one or more cartels within the retail food packaging sector. 
The products concerned were polystyrene plastic trays ("foam trays") and, in respect of one of 
the cartels, also polypropylene plastic trays ("rigid trays") -  both used for retail packaging of 
fresh food such as meat, poultry, fruits and fish.  
The Decision concerns five cartels which each took place in a different geographical region 
within the EEA, namely Italy, south-west Europe (covering Spain and Portugal), France, 
central-eastern Europe (covering Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary) and north-
west Europe (covering Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden). The cartels were undertaken in different periods and with varying 
durations between March 2000 and February 2008 by tray manufacturers and, in relation to 
south-west Europe and central-eastern Europe, also by distributors.  
With some differences between the five cartels, the cartel participants engaged in price fixing, 
customer allocation and market sharing, exchange of price-sensitive information and bid-
rigging, mainly with the objectives of maintaining high prices, passing on raw material price 
increases in a coordinated manner and preserving the status quo with regard to the historically 
allocated clients and markets. The Commission imposed fines amounting to a total of EUR 
115 865 000 for the five cartels. Under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice, Linpac 
received full immunity for revealing the existence of the cartels and avoided fines of totalling 
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of EUR 145 065 000. Vitembal, Sirap-Gema, Coopbox, Magic Pack, Silver Plastics and 
Ovarpack were all granted reductions of their fine/fines on the basis of their cooperation in 
the Commission's investigation providing information on one or more cartels. Finally, all the 
undertakings were exceptionally granted a 5 % reduction of their fines to reflect the 
considerable duration of the proceeding (seven years) and the special circumstances of the 
case.  
Merger investigations in basic industries 
GE/Alstom 
In 2015, the Commission cleared the acquisition of the Thermal Power, Renewable Power 
and Grid businesses of Alstom by General Electric (GE), subject to conditions 
(GE/Alstom
202
). Following an in-depth investigation, the Commission found that the 
transaction, as initially notified, would have created significant horizontal overlaps in the gas-
related part of Alstom's Thermal Power business, mainly in relation to the supply of Heavy 
Duty Gas Turbines (HDGTs), where the global market leader GE would have acquired the 
third largest competitor in the EEA. 
HDGTs are the prime mover of gas fired power plants, which are expected to play an 
important role in the European energy mix in the coming decades as a flexible complement to 
electricity generation from renewable energies. Moreover, it is likely that HDGTs will be 
important in the possible phasing out of less energy-efficient and more polluting coal-fired 
plants.  
The Commission found that already before the transaction the choice of many HDGT 
customers appeared to be limited to two or three options at most because of the (1) the highly 
concentrated market structure, with only four full technology competitors, Alstom, GE, 
MHPS and Siemens, (2) the high degree of product differentiation and (3) the high barriers to 
entry. The Commission's investigation which, among other evidence, was based on a detailed 
analysis of tenders over a five-year period, further showed that Alstom was, in particular in 
Europe, an important HDGT competitor, and in both Europe and in the worldwide 50Hz 
markets, a close competitor of GE for HDGTs. Therefore, further to the transaction, 
customers would have suffered a significant reduction of choice, likely resulting in significant 
price increases. Moreover, in the course of the Commission's investigation, Alstom emerged 
as one of the most innovative OEMs in the HDGT market and, thus, the transaction would 
also have significantly reduced innovation competition.  
The commitments consisted in the divestment of the HDGT business of Alstom to the number 
five player in the world, Ansaldo. The objective of the remedy is not only to guarantee the 
continued availability of choice in the market for HDGTs, but also to replicate Alstom's 
innovation capabilities. The divestiture therefore includes Alstom's technology for its most 
advanced HDGTs, existing upgrades and pipeline technology for future upgrades, R&D 
engineers, testing facilities, Alstom's servicing subsidiary PSM and servicing contracts for 
some of the largest and most recent Alstom HDGTs. 
The remainder of the transaction was cleared without commitments, as the Commission found 
that GE's activities were largely complementary to Alstom's Grid and Renewables businesses 
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from a product and geographic point of view. The same applied to the coal-fired and nuclear-
related parts of Alstom's Thermal Power business. 
State aid investigations in basic industries 
Two notable State aid cases in manufacturing, in 2015 concerned measures (mostly loans) 
provided by France as a part of an exceptional and temporary support package to help viable 
intermediate–sized companies experiencing economic difficulties and undergoing collective 
proceedings. The package was based on the French Economic and Social Development Fund 
(FDES).  
As regards the application of the FDES on 28 July, following an in-depth investigation, the 
Commission approved EUR 125 million in restructuring aid to Kem One
203
. Kem One is a 
French chlorochemicals and PVC producer which encountered severe financial difficulties 
that led to the opening of a court-supervised administration procedure in March 2013. In July, 
to help the company to survive, France notified a restructuring plan involving three types of 
support measure: (i) a loan of EUR 30 million from the FDES, (ii) a grant of EUR 15 million 
and (iii) repayable advances of EUR 80 million. During its in-depth investigation, the 
Commission confirmed that the notified measures constituted State aid conferring an 
economic advantage on Kem One because they had not been granted on the same terms as a 
market operator would have required. However, the Commission found the aid to be 
compatible with State aid rules for rescue and restructuring. In order to reach such conclusion 
after having carefully examined the competitive situation in the increasingly concentrated 
market for S-PVC in Europe, the Commission imposed three types of conditions: (i) the 
freezing of Kem One’s current nominal production capacities of chlorine (and thus of PVC 
for which chlorine is an essential input), (ii) to cap Kem One's expected market share on the 
S-PVC market in northwest Europe, and (iii) an acquisition ban for Kem One and its 
controlling shareholders on other businesses active on the same northwest European market as 
Kem One. All conditions are limited in time and will be closely monitored in their market 
context. 
On 6 November, the Commission concluded
204
 that a EUR 17.5 million loan as well as the 
partial financing of the social plan through specific social measures, both granted by the 
French State constituted incompatible State aid in favour of Mory-Ducros and its post-
insolvency successor Mory Global (both active in the market for supply of transport and 
logistic services). Despite Mory-Ducros being the number two provider of logistic services in 
France, artificially maintaining a failed business model (Mory-Ducros has been wound up and 
Mory Global is currently facing a receivership procedure) would have prevented more 
efficient competitors from growing and, over time, increased costs to customers. The French 
State will have to claim recovery of the undue aid in the receivership procedure. 
In addition, on 12 June, the Commission adopted a decision as regards the main Romanian 
electricity generator Hidroelectrica, which is majority owned by the State. On 25 April, the 
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Commission opened formal proceedings
205
 in relation to sale of electricity by Hidroelectrica 
to several industrial buyers (e.g. aluminium, steel, graphite electrode producers) at prices 
allegedly set below market level. Following an in-depth investigation of market conditions 
and prices in Romania, the Commission concluded that the contracts concluded by 
Hidroelectrica with the alleged beneficiaries did not constitute State aid. By contrast, also 
following an in-depth investigation, the Commission found that the contracts concluded by 
Hidroelectrica with Electrocentrale Deva and Termoelectrica contained in years 2010 and 
2011 preferential electricity tariffs in favour of the latter companies, and so constituted 
incompatible State aid. Therefore, both beneficiaries (or their legal and economic successors) 
were held liable to pay back the aid.  
 6. AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY 
Overview of key challenges in the agricultural sector  
EU agricultural markets have certain structural characteristics that contribute to create 
difficult conditions for farmers placing them in a disadvantaged economic position in the food 
chain. Agricultural producers tend to be highly atomised with many small holdings serving 
the market, while their inputs suppliers and customers (processors, wholesalers and retailers) 
are often much larger and more concentrated. Agricultural producers therefore typically have 
very little bargaining power in their negotiations vis-à-vis large suppliers and buyers. In 
addition, farmers face sustained and increased competition from non-EU producers. 
To redress this situation, the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy reform, while maintaining the 
application of competition laws to agriculture, set out derogations to antitrust rules for certain 
agricultural sectors, in particular olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops (cereals, oilseeds 
etc.)
206
. The aim of these new rules is to increase the competitiveness and sustainability of EU 
farmers (i.e. producers) in those sectors as well as strengthening their bargaining power vis-a-
vis their buyers, while preserving a market-oriented approach. The new rules allow joint 
selling by producer organisations provided that the amounts sold remain at moderate levels in 
the relevant market (15 % or 20 %), the producer organisation integrates other activities than 
selling (for instance, storage or distribution) and that such integration between producers 
creates significant efficiencies. 
In November 2015, the Commission adopted new Guidelines on the application of Articles 
169, 170 and 171 of Regulation 1308/2013 establishing a Common Market Organisation for 
agricultural products (CMO Regulation) for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops 
sectors
207
. The Guidelines are intended to ensure the new derogations are applied consistently, 
helping farmers and other market operators to understand how to apply such derogations and 
how to obtain efficiencies in joint activities. In addition, the Commission has set up a task 
force of experts, whose mandate is to take a thorough look at the challenges faced in EU 
agricultural markets.  
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Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
In light of the continuing difficult situation in several agricultural sectors, the Commission 
continued its work throughout 2015 in order to address the main challenges arising out of the 
supply chain, in particular the competitive position of the farmers and the practices of large 
retailers and manufacturers. The sector faced particular difficulties in the spring and summer 
of 2015. Dairy farmers and pork producers were strongly hit by a number of factors, including 
weakening demand, increased production in all major producing regions (Europe, United 
States, New Zealand and Australia), the Russian ban on agricultural products and ongoing 
export bans linked with African swine fever in parts of the EU. As a consequence, prices fell 
sharply due to a worsening of oversupply in the market. 
Given these difficult market conditions, farmers demonstrated across France, Belgium and 
other Member States throughout the summer against the low farm-gate prices. The protests 
were largely targeted at retailers, arguing that price competition between retailers drives retail 
prices down and that retailers are able to use their superior bargaining power to bring down 
the price paid to farmers. In response to the summer's agricultural crisis, the Commission 
focused on addressing the underlying structural issues in the market rather than adopting 
"sticking-plaster" solutions. Many market operators responded to the low prices in the 
agricultural sector by taking initiatives that favour national production. Such initiatives may 
be incompatible with the goals of a single market for food products since they can hinder 
imports from other Member States and raise concerns under competition rules. The 
Commission intervened in several such cases, demonstrating its stance regarding conduct that 
segments the market along national borders and ensuring that farmers in all Member States 
have fair access to the market.  
In early 2015, the Commission initiated an investigation
 
into an agreement between the 
French retailer, Carrefour, and the main French federation of vegetable growers, Les 
Producteurs de Légumes de France (Légumes de France). The agreement aimed to restrict 
most of Carrefour's procurement of certain seasonal vegetables in France to the members of 
Légumes de France, excluding vegetable producers from other Member States from the 
French market. The agreement, which was the first of its kind and was only limited to one 
retailer (Carrefour), was renounced by the retailer after the Commission initiated its 
investigation. The investigation was therefore closed without a finding of an infringement. 
In the aftermath of the agricultural crisis in summer 2015, a number of market participants at 
various levels of the supply chain in France and Belgium agreed on initiatives aiming at 
improving the remuneration of producers of milk and pork. At the end of 2015 the 
Commission started to collect information in order to assess complaints that the alleged 
agreements could potentially restrict competition from farmers from other Member States 
exporting their products to those national markets. 
Prevention of parallel trade by food manufacturers and processors 
The Commission has also been looking into consumer price differences among Member 
States for identical food products. This is not in itself a breach of the EU competition rules, 
and can be explained by several factors. First, there are regulatory factors including 
differences in fiscal and labour market policies which differ across Member States. Shop 
opening regulations can also in some cases limit competition and raise prices. Second, 
product markets and supply chains operate differently in each Member State. For example, 
consumers can have different purchasing powers and price sensitivity, and the levels of 
competition at retail and wholesale levels differ between Member States.  
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However, these factors may only explain a part of retail price differences between Member 
States. Another possible reason can be that suppliers can charge different prices in different 
markets and prevent retailers from bringing products from lower-priced markets to higher-
priced markets. In 2015 the Commission started looking into instances of possible restrictions 
by suppliers of the cross-border distribution of food products by retailers from one Member 
State to another Member State (so-called "parallel trade"). 
Issues concerning modern retail 
In October 2014 the Commission published its study, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector. Throughout 2015, the Commission 
conducted its follow up to the study, engaging with industry stakeholders to analyse the 
results. 
A key question raised by the study is the decrease in innovation and in particular whether the 
position of retailers as both customers and competitors of brand manufacturers simultaneously 
through their offer of Private Label (retailer own brand) products can be used to their 
advantage, creating an uneven playing field in the wholesale market. Brand manufacturers 
argue that certain retailer practices concerning their Private Labels reduces incentives to 
innovate. As part of the follow-up to the study, in 2015 the Commission started looking into 
whether such practices can reduce innovation available to consumers at the market level. 
Merger investigations in the agri-food industry  
DEMB/Mondelez/Charger Opco 
In May, the Commission cleared, subject to remedies208, the creation of a joint venture 
between Mondelēz (United States) and DEMB (Netherlands) - two of the world's leading 
manufacturers of branded coffee products available on retailers' shelves. In addition to 
investigating traditional Roast and Ground (‘R&G’) and instant coffee products, the 
Commission also took a close look at the effects of the transaction in respect of innovative 
single-serve coffee products. Mondelēz produces and markets T-discs, which are consumables 
for the Tassimo single-serve machines, while DEMB manufactures and sells filter pads, 
which are consumables for Senseo single-serve machines. Due to IPR protection, T-discs can 
only be manufactured by Mondelēz whilst all coffee companies (including Mondelēz) and 
retailers can manufacture filter pads in competition with DEMB. Although neither Mondelēz 
nor DEMB manufactures and sells single-serve machines (this is done by their partners Bosch 
and Philips), they are able, and have the incentive, to influence the prices of these machines 
by using coupons, cash-backs and other promotional levers to increase sales, and thus 
penetration, of these systems. 
The Commission conducted an in-depth investigation on whether the combination of Senseo 
and Tassimo would lead to higher prices and less innovation. Ultimately, the Commission 
concluded that due to the dynamic and growing nature of single-serve coffee machines and 
their consumables, the joint venture would have no incentives to raise prices of the Senseo 
and Tassimo machines through reduced subsidies. On the contrary, the incentive would be to 
increase penetration of the machines in order to ensure continued and increased sales of 
corresponding filter pads and T-discs, which is where the joint venture would make its profits. 
                                                          
208
 Case M.7292 DEMB/Mondelēz/Charger OpCo, Commission decision of 5 May 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7292   
 68 
Competitive pressure from Nestlé, which owns the other two single-serve systems – Dolce 
Gusto and Nespresso, was also taken into account. 
The Commission did raise concerns in respect of the combination of leading consumer brands 
in R&G coffee in France, Denmark and Latvia as well as in the filter pads (compatible with 
the Senseo system) markets in Austria and France. To alleviate these concerns, the parties 
sold their Carte Noire and Merrild businesses and, in Austria, granted a licence for the Senseo 
brand, to Lavazza. 
State aid enforcement in the agricultural and forestry sectors and rural areas 
In 2014 the Commission adopted a block exemption regulation
209
 and Guidelines on State 
aids in the agricultural and forestry sectors and rural areas
210
 as part of the SAM initiative. In 
2015, the Commission dealt with more than 700 cases in these fields, about 90 % of which 
were block exemptions. Many of the cases related to the rural development measures 
providing State aid clearance for the implementation of Rural Development programs of the 
Member States. Thus, it contributed to the growth in the rural economy and the improvement 
of the business and living conditions in the rural areas. 
 7. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
A key feature of the pharmaceutical and health services sector in the EU is the high degree of 
regulation at Member State level which leads to significant national variations of medicine 
pricing and wholesale and pharmacy margins. Nevertheless, EU competition policy in this 
sector can contribute to promoting innovation, R&D and growth while providing access to 
cheaper medicines for European citizens.  
The legislative framework, including the patent system, has a special significance in allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to reap the benefits of their successful R&D activities. Upon the 
expiry of data exclusivity and patent protection, generic and bio-similar companies typically 
enter the market with much lower priced versions of the originator's product. Generic entry 
therefore contributes to cost-containment. Competition by generics is also a dynamic force 
that incentivises originator companies to continue investing in R&D to bring innovative 
medicines to the market. Competition in innovation is also crucial between originator 
medicines, particularly during the period when these medicines are protected by data 
exclusivity and/or patents. EU competition policy aims to protect European citizens from anti-
competitive practices of pharmaceutical companies in order to support innovation and 
facilitate access to cheaper medicines
211
.  
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Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
In 2015, the Commission published the non-confidential version of its decisions in the 
Lundbeck
212
, Fentanyl
213
 and Servier
214
 investigations, which provide a detailed legal and 
economic analysis of agreements between originator and generic pharmaceutical companies 
that delayed the market entry of cheaper generic medicines. Such practices were deemed to 
harm patients, national health systems and taxpayers because prices for the originator 
medicines could remain artificially high. In the Servier case, the Commission also assessed an 
abuse of dominance by Servier which consisted in using methods others than those of 
competition on the merits to delay and prevent generic entry. While the Lundbeck and Servier 
decisions are under appeal, a fourth investigation by the Commission in relation to the market 
entry of generic modafinil (sleeping disorder medicine) in the EEA is currently ongoing
215
. 
Pay-for-delay deals have also been investigated by national competition authorities and 
courts. For example, in France, the Paris Court of Appeal has rejected Reckitt Benckiser's 
appeal of the French Competition Authority's decision to fine Reckitt Benckiser for its 
agreement with Schering-Plough to delay the entry of generic subutex (anti-heroin addiction 
medicine)
216
. The Commission continued monitoring patent settlements between originator 
and generic companies. The sixth report published on 2 December 2015 confirmed the 
continued use of settlement agreements which reached 76 in total in 2014, the year covered by 
the sixth monitoring exercise. The portion of B.II settlements (i.e. those containing a 
limitation on generic entry and a value transfer from the originator to the generic company) 
remained low, constituting 12 % of all settlements concluded in 2014
217
. 
Recent enforcement trends 
Merger enforcement practice focused on innovation and investments as important competitive 
dimensions  
The Commission's enforcement practice in 2015 shows, that the likely impact on innovation 
and investment plays an important role in the Commission's assessment of mergers.  
In March, the Commission conditionally approved the acquisition of Biomet Inc. by Zimmer 
Holdings Inc.
218
, both companies producing orthopaedic implants and related surgical 
products. The Commission had concerns that the merger could have resulted in price increase 
for a number of orthopaedic implants in the EEA. Therefore, the Commission made its 
clearance decision conditional upon Zimmer divesting its knee implant business across the 
EEA and its system for primary and revision implants in Denmark and Sweden, granting non-
exclusive licenses to the rights and know-how currently used and needed to manufacture, 
market and sell an identical knee implant (including appropriate intellectual property, 
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technology and know-how) and a transitional period to supply the divestment businesses' 
product lines at reasonable conditions. This remedy will preserve the future competition and 
innovation in orthopaedic implants and related surgical products.  
The proposed acquisition of Hospira by Pfizer, both players in the pharmaceutical industry, 
concerned bio-similar medicines. Bio-similar medicines are those that have the same 
therapeutic mechanism as originator's biological medicine, which may be patented, but are 
expected to significantly lower prices for patients. Similarly to what has been the case for 
mergers between originators and generic businesses, the Commission found that following the 
merger, Pfizer would be likely to either delay or discontinue the development of its own bio-
similar medicine in order to focus on Hospira's product, leading to the net loss of future 
competition. Therefore, the Commission made its clearance decision of 4 August
219
 
conditional upon Pfizer fully divesting the development, manufacturing and EEA-wide 
marketing rights of its relevant bio-similar medicine currently under development (including 
appropriate intellectual property, technology and know-how). This remedy will preserve 
future innovation in bio-similar medicines.  
The consolidation trend affecting the pharmaceutical industry continued over the course of 
2015, and the Commission had adopted 15 decisions covering the sector by the end of the 
year, with more to come in 2016. In the four cases which raised competition concerns 
(Novartis / GSK Oncology
220
, GSK / Novartis Vaccines and Consumer Health
221
, Mylan / 
Abbott-EPD-DM
222
 and Pfizer / Hospira
223
); the transaction was cleared subject to remedies, 
following a phase I investigation. This illustrates the Commission's ability to clear complex 
cases, often involving novel product markets in a challenging industry, without opening in-
depth investigations. 
The main change in the Commission's practice regarding pharmaceutical mergers is the 
deepening of its impact assessment on innovation competition, including for medicines that 
are yet to be approved. In Novartis / GSK Oncology, the Commission extended its analysis of 
pipeline pharmaceutical products beyond those that are in advanced stages of development, in 
order to fully assess the impact of the merger on clinical research programs. The Commission 
found that the acquisition of GlaxoSmithKline's oncology business by Novartis entailed the 
risk that Novartis would likely stop developing two innovative medicines that show great 
promise for the treatment of skin cancer, because Novartis would acquire similar medicines 
from GlaxoSmithKline. Therefore, the Commission insisted on remedies which ensured 
effective competition in the development of medicines against cancer post transaction and 
made its clearance decision of January conditional upon compliance of the merged entity with 
those remedies
224
. In Pfizer / Hospira, the Commission investigated markets for bio-similar 
medicines, and found that they present some features that distinguish them from markets for 
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generics medicines. This led to the divestment of a bio-similar medicine that was still under 
development. 
Accordingly, the Commission's assessment of pharmaceutical mergers to ensure not only that 
a healthy price competition is maintained for the benefit of payers and healthcare services, but 
also that research and development efforts are not diminished for the benefit of patients and 
healthcare providers. 
State aid actions in the health services sector 
The Commission's State aid actions in the health services sector mainly concern hospitals, 
related services (such as ambulance transport and medical laboratories) and health insurance. 
The Commission decision of 20 December 2011 (based on Article 106(2) TFEU
225
) specifies 
the conditions under which compensation to companies for providing public services is 
compatible with the EU State aid rules and does not have to be notified to the Commission in 
advance. Compensation granted to hospitals, including emergency services and ancillary 
services, for services of general economic interest, benefits from the decision irrespective of 
the amounts involved provided that the conditions are met. Accordingly, the Commission 
very rarely takes decisions on financing covered by this exemption decision. 
During 2015, the Commission continued examining a number of complaints lodged by private 
health service providers about their allegedly unfair treatment or potentially excessive 
compensation of publicly-owned hospitals. Those complaints usually came from operators in 
Member States with healthcare markets more open to competition (e.g. Belgium, France, and 
Germany
226
). On 29 April, as part of a larger package of cases, the Commission adopted three 
decisions concerning small-scale public support for specific health service providers, finding 
that in all three cases the particular circumstances were such that the measure in question had 
no effect on trade and thus did not constitute State aid
227
. 
 8. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Towards a competitive and innovate European industry 
The transport and postal services sectors account for about 4.9 % of the EU economy228, and 
their performance can have many beneficial effects for other sectors of the European 
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economy. In 2015, the emphasis was on how competition tools can help improve performance 
in these sectors, especially through innovation and improvements to infrastructure. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Antitrust enforcement in air transport  
The Commission continued its work on the transatlantic airline alliances.  
In May, it adopted a decision
229
 accepting commitments offered by SkyTeam alliance 
members Air France/KLM, Alitalia and Delta on three transatlantic routes. These 
commitments related to agreements these members signed in 2009 and 2010, establishing a 
transatlantic joint venture. The Commission had concerns that the extensive cooperation 
between the parties, involving profit-sharing and the joint management of schedules, pricing 
and capacity, might result in higher prices for premium passengers on the Paris-New York 
route and for all passengers on the Amsterdam-New York and Rome-New York routes. In this 
context the Commission initially concluded that the competition between the parties to the 
joint venture was unlikely to be replaced by competition from existing competitors or from 
likely, timely and sufficient new entry or expansion, because there are significant barriers to 
entry and expansion in these markets.  
The commitment package seeks to address this problem by making landing and take-off slots 
available to new competitors thus facilitating entry on these routes. The parties also offered to 
enter into agreements allowing competitors to get better access to the parties' connecting 
traffic. The commitment package is legally binding on these airlines for 10 years. 
As a result, the Commission concluded its investigation of the three transatlantic airline joint 
venture agreements within the major global alliances (Oneworld; Star; SkyTeam), which 
contributes towards a genuine level playing field in transatlantic aviation markets. The 
Commission adopted commitment decisions in the Oneworld case
230
 and in the Star Alliance 
case
231
 respectively in July 2010 and May 2013.  
Merger review in air transport 
The air transport sector is still very fragmented. In the EU there are more than 150 airlines 
offering scheduled air passenger transport. The five largest airlines in the EU (i.e. Lufthansa, 
AirFrance/KLM and International Consolidated Airlines Group (IAG, the holding company 
of British Airways and Iberia), Ryanair and EasyJet) account for only 50 % of the EU market. 
In contrast, in the United States, the three legacy carrier groups American Airlines, Delta and 
United together with low cost carrier Southwest jointly control more than 80 % of the United 
States market. The drive towards further consolidation of the EU market in 2015 was lessened 
by low fuel costs which had a positive impact on airline profitability.  
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In this context the Commission reviewed the acquisition of the Irish carrier Aer Lingus by 
IAG
232
. The Commission's investigation indicated that the merger would raise two types of 
competition concerns. Firstly, on certain routes where both the airlines operated there would 
not be sufficient competition. Secondly, the choices of airlines available for connecting long-
haul flights would have decreased if Aer Lingus were to connect only to long-haul flights 
operated by IAG and vice versa - especially considering that before the merger Aer Lingus 
had agreements with a number of third-party carriers to bring passengers to their hubs for 
certain long-haul flights. Consequently, the transaction was cleared subject to (i) the release 
of five slots at London Gatwick Airport to entice new entrants on the Dublin-London and 
Belfast-London routes and (ii) IAG entering into agreements with competing airlines which 
operate long-haul flights out of London Heathrow, London Gatwick, Manchester, 
Amsterdam, Shannon and Dublin, so that Aer Lingus will continue to provide these airlines 
with connecting passengers. Passengers will therefore continue to have a choice of using other 
airlines than IAG when connecting at these airports, for instance when on routes such as 
Heathrow–New York, Gatwick–Las Vegas, Manchester–Orlando, Shannon–Chicago or 
Dublin–Chicago. 
Rescue and restructuring aid in air transport  
In 2015, the Commission adopted two negative decisions closing in-depth investigations 
concerning aid to Cyprus Airways and Estonian Air
233
. The Commission concluded that 
repeated public support granted by Cyprus and Estonia over many years to their ailing 
national flag carriers breached EU State aid rules, in particular the so called "one time, last 
time principle" providing that rescue and restructuring aid can be granted only once in a 10-
year period. Furthermore, both airlines did not have credible restructuring plans capable of 
ensuring their long-term viability without continued State support. Cyprus Airways also did 
not provide a sufficient own contribution to the restructuring costs while Estonian Air did not 
offer sufficient measures to limit the distortions of competition caused by the aid. 
Consequently, the Commission ordered Cyprus and Estonia to recover the incompatible aid 
received by the airlines of around EUR 65 million and EUR 85 million, respectively. In 
addition, it continued to monitor the implementation of previously approved restructuring aid, 
notably to Adria Airways, airBaltic, Air Malta and LOT Polish Airlines. 
State aid to airports and airlines 
2015 was the first full year of application of the Guidelines on State aid to airports and 
airlines, which entered into force on 4 April 2014
234
. Following the previous year's 
introduction of the guidelines, and the adoption of a large number of decisions on long-
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running investigations, 2015 was a rather more balanced year, for developing the new 
approach that the guidelines set out. 
In this regard, the first national schemes to be adopted under the new guidelines aim to serve 
as a model of how the different categories of aid that can be authorised in the airports and 
airlines sector can be applied. In particular, France was authorised to have three separate 
national schemes (investment aid, operating aid for airport infrastructure
235
, and "start-up" aid 
for airlines operating from regional airports)
236
. The United Kingdom also had a national 
start-up aid scheme authorised
237
, and Ireland had a national scheme covering investment and 
operating aid for airport infrastructure authorised
238
. 
The guidelines make it clear that both the Commission and Member States can achieve a 
lower administration burden by using schemes in this sector. However, decisions were also 
taken throughout the year on individual airports, either when such airports could not be 
covered by a national scheme, or when the Member State concerned had so far not put such a 
scheme into place
239
. 
The application of the guidelines was also consolidated by opening of new investigations, 
notably two investigations were opened on the same day concerning two Romanian airports in 
relatively close proximity, as well as the airlines that operate from those airports
240
. 
As an expected consequence of the very active 2014, a number of appeals were lodged in 
2015 in the General Court by various parties against decisions taken in 2014, in particular 
against the negative decisions ordering the recovery of aid for airlines or airports. The 
Commission has begun its work to defend these decisions. 
Maritime transport  
On State aid control, the emphasis in 2015 was on ensuring continued compliance with the 
Maritime State aid guidelines
241
. The most important decision in this respect requested 
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appropriate measures regarding the existing Greek tonnage tax scheme
242
. Greece was 
requested to exclude from preferential tax treatment shareholders of shipping companies and 
wider maritime cluster companies (including insurance intermediaries). Similarly, Greece was 
asked to ensure that its shipping companies respect the obligation to keep or increase the 
share of the fleet under EU/EEA flags. The Commission also adopted final decisions in the 
French tonnage tax case, which concentrated on enforcing rules on time chartered fleet and 
the flag link
243
. More generally, in 2015 the Commission paid specific attention that maritime 
aid schemes, including the tonnage tax notifications that it handled
244
, excluded ship lessors, 
and that the maximum aid ceiling of the guidelines was not exceeded through e.g. transitional 
arrangements related to the switch from profit taxation to tonnage taxation. 
In 2015, the Commission accepted start-up State aid to a new Franco-Spanish short-sea 
shipping route between Algeciras/Vigo and Havre/Nantes-Saint Nazaire, enabling a freight 
traffic shift from road to sea
245
.  
In terms of merger review, maritime transport can be roughly divided into three segments: (i) 
transport on inland waterways (rivers, canals and lakes, etc.); (ii) deep-sea shipping 
(intercontinental); and (iii) short-sea shipping (between ports in the EU and other European 
ports on the Mediterranean or Black Sea).  
Short-sea shipping plays a major role for many EU industries, which rely on it for their 
deliveries; for instance 58 % of total EU maritime transport of goods happened via short-sea 
shipping in 2013
246
. On certain routes short-sea shipping competes (or in some cases 
complements) multi-modal transport services such as rail and road transportation. The short-
sea shipping sector enjoys healthy competition and low barriers to entry. Indeed when in June 
2015 the Commission reviewed the acquisition of Oldenburg-Portugiesische Dampfschiffs-
Rhederei (OPDR) of Germany by CMA CGM of France
247
 it concluded that the acquisition 
would raise no competition concerns given the low switching costs for customers, who can 
also use alternative means of transport such as road or rail, and given the low barriers for 
competitors to enter or expand their services by adding new ships or new ports of call. 
State aid enforcement in port infrastructure  
Under the current legal framework, where there are no specific instruments regarding State 
aid to ports, the Commission assesses notifications and complaints in the field of aid for port 
infrastructure directly under Articles 107(3)(c) TFEU or 93 TFEU depending on the type of 
                                                          
242
 Case SA.33828 (2012/E) Greek tonnage tax scheme and other State measure in favour of shipping 
companies, Commission decision of 18 December 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_33828  
243 
Case SA.14551 Taxation au tonnage, Commission decision of 4 February 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_14551 
244
 Cases SA.37912 Croatia - Tonnage Tax Scheme, Commission decision of 1 April 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251015/251015_1667829_98_2.pdf and SA.38085 Italy - 
Prolongation of the tonnage tax scheme, Commission decision of 13 April 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251318/251318_1667835_99_2.pdf 
245
 Cases SA.41620 and SA.41651 Start-up aid for motorway of the sea between ports of Algeciras y Vigo in 
Spain and ports of Havre and Nantes-Saint Nazaire, Commission decisions of 17 September 2015 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/258208/258208_1699829_86_2.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/258252/258252_1699831_91_2.pdf  
246
 Eurostat Statistics Explained, Maritime transport statistics – short sea shipping of goods (April 2015) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_statistics_-
_short_sea_shipping_of_goods.  
247
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port (seaport or inland). In 2015, the Commission continued its case-by-case approach and 
adopted 16 decisions on State aid for port infrastructure, which have clarified a number of 
important points
248
. In particular, the Commission found that public funding of EUR 270 
million to build a new cross-Channel terminal in the Port of Calais was in line with EU State 
aid rules
249
. The new infrastructure furthers EU transport policy objectives without unduly 
distorting competition in the internal market. In addition, with the decisions in the 
Lauwersoog
250
 and Maasholm
251
 cases, the Commission clarified that in some circumstances 
a potential effect on competition and trade may be excluded. The Commission also confirmed 
that the construction of access infrastructure to ports (e.g. public roads, rail connections, 
utilities etc.) which is made available free of charge to all users and is thus not commercially 
exploitable, may be regarded as non-economic, if it is not specifically dedicated to 
commercially exploited port infrastructure
252
. 
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Moreover, the Commission adopted a negative final decision as regards certain fiscal benefits 
granted by Greece in favour to port operator Piraeus Container Terminal S.A. and required 
recovery of the unjustified advantage to the Greek State
253
. 
Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 
On 5 January, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to the Lithuanian railway 
incumbent AB Lietuvos Geležinkeliai254 in which it informed this company that it may have 
breached competition rules by removing a railway track connecting Lithuania with Latvia. 
The Commission is concerned that removing this track may have impeded customers from 
switching to other rail operators for transporting freight between Lithuania and Latvia. The 
Commission's investigation continues. 
Rail and intermodal State aid enforcement  
In 2015, the Commission approved a number of schemes supporting rail and intermodal 
transport, which aim to support the transfer of cargo from the road to the safer and more 
environmentally friendly rail transport mode
255
. The Commission also approved the financing 
of the Fehmarn Belt fixed rail-road link
256
, a key element for completing the main north-south 
route connecting central Europe and the Nordic countries. The costs of this project are 
estimated to be EUR 8.7 billion, part of which is funded by the EU through the Connecting 
Europe Facility
257
. The Commission approved this financing, as it was in line with State aid 
rules since the funding promotes the execution of an important project of common interest. 
The tunnel will be approximately 19 kilometres long and will consist of an electrified, double-
track railway and a four-lane motorway with emergency lanes. 
During 2015, the Commission closely followed the negotiations in the Council concerning the 
fourth railway package. This bundle of legislation should help further open up the railway 
sector to competition. 
Merger review in the rail sector 
Rail passenger transport in the EU has been on an upward trend since 2010
258
 and over the 
last decade the share of rail passengers using high speed trains has also been growing; 
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similarly, investments in infrastructure such as high speed train tracks has been constantly 
expanding
259
. The fourth railway package aims to provide non-discriminatory access to the 
EU rail network
260
. In this context, the Commission cleared the acquisition of sole control of 
Eurostar by the French rail operator SNCF subject to commitments designed to facilitate the 
entry of new rail operators onto the London-Brussels and London-Paris routes
261
. The 
Commission was concerned that the deal as originally notified might hinder the entry of 
competitors on these routes, mainly as regards access to stations in France and Belgium and to 
maintenance centres in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
State aid review in the road sector 
The Commission continued to enforce Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger 
transport services
262
. In two cases, the Commission took a negative decision on retroactive 
public service compensations awarded by judgments of Italy's Consiglio di Stato (Council of 
State)
263
. In one similar case the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure against 
Italy
264
. This was a continuation of a series of cases following the so-called Simet case
265
. 
In addition, the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure with respect to a set of 
measures implemented by a public bus company in Finland, raising concerns that the public 
authorities had acted as a private market investor would have done
266
. 
Continuing to apply the new rules ensuring the viability of SGEIs and fair competition across 
the single market in postal services  
The postal sector continues to evolve and traditional letter delivery, against the backdrop of 
electronic substitution, remains on a declining trajectory. Nevertheless, postal services have 
retained a very significant economic and social value. In a shrinking market of traditional 
letter delivery, many postal incumbents are being forced to diversify the portfolio of their 
activities and innovate in order to stay competitive. At the same time, the explosive growth of 
e-commerce necessitates a well-functioning parcel delivery market linking buyers and sellers. 
Efficient postal services are thus a key factor in allowing e-commerce to realise its potential in 
propelling growth and creating jobs.  
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Through State aid control in the postal sector, the Commission pursues multiple related goals. 
First, State aid control ensures that where a postal service provider – typically a postal 
incumbent – is entrusted with a costly public service obligation, any compensation paid to the 
provider does not undermine a level playing field between postal incumbents and new 
entrants. State aid should not relieve recipients of competitive pressures and market 
developments incentivising efficiency, propelling innovation and promoting investment. 
Second, where compensation for public service obligation is not funded directly from the 
State budget, but from contributions collected by all postal operators (a "compensation fund"), 
the Commission ensures that the contribution mechanism is designed in a way that does not 
disincentivise market entry and expansion of new entrants. Three examples can illustrate how 
the Commission strives to achieve both goals:  
First, on 19 March, the Commission approved United Kingdom plans to grant GBP 640 
million to the UK Post Offices Ltd for delivering a range of public services over three 
years
267
. In this case the Commission assessment showed that the compensation to Post 
Offices Ltd, paid directly from the State budget, was designed to ensure that it would not 
exceed the cost of the public service obligation. In particular, the payment depended on Post 
Offices Ltd reaching certain annual milestones, giving Post Offices Ltd a strong incentive to 
be efficient in providing the public services.  
Secondly, on 26 November, the Commission approved compensation granted by Poland to 
Polish Post for the delivery of the universal postal service in 2013-15
268
. In this case, the 
compensation was partly funded from a compensation fund relying on contributions from all 
postal operators in Poland. The Commission thoroughly assessed every element of the design 
of the contribution mechanism before concluding that postal operators' contributions were 
neither discriminatory nor disproportionate. In consequence, it was concluded that the 
compensation fund did not lead to serious distortions of competition in the Polish postal 
market. The approval decision in this case was the Commission's second decision addressing 
the issue of compensation funds and the first one to approve a compensation fund 
mechanism
269
. 
Third, on 4 December the Commission approved State financing for Poste Italiane's universal 
service obligation
270
. The Commission's assessment showed that the compensation to be 
granted to Poste Italiane is based on a conservative methodology, which ensures that it will 
not exceed the cost of the public service mission. In particular, all intangible benefits related 
to the status of being the provider of the universal service obligation, such as the synergies 
between postal and financial services, are taken into account in the calculation. Furthermore, 
the amount of aid granted decreases significantly over time, taking account of significant 
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efficiency gains that will be made over the period of entrustment of the universal service 
obligation. 
Merger review in postal services 
Postal services play a crucial role in allowing e-commerce to develop, the promotion of which 
is one of the goals of the Digital Single Market strategy. The Commission investigation of the 
acquisition of TNT Express by FedEx
271 
focused on ensuring that prices for customers, 
including SMEs active in e-commerce, and ultimately consumers, would not rise for cross-
border small package deliveries, and that the quality of service would not be degraded as a 
result of the merger. 
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Annexes 
Banking State aid cases: Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2015 
By country 
Member State Case number/Title Type of Decision Date of adoption 
Austria SA.31883 – 2015/N, 2011/C – 
ÖVAG (amendment) 
No objection
272
 02/07/2015 
 State Aid SA.40965 (2015/N) 
Restructuring guarantee scheme 
for small undertakings in 
difficulty in Upper Austria 
No objection 11/08/2015 
Belgium SA.43306 (2015/N) 
Amendment to the restructuring 
plan of Ethias –Approval of 
issuance of additional 
subordinated debt 
No objection 23/10/2015 
Cyprus SA.40027 (2014/N) – Fifth 
prolongation of Cypriot 
guarantee scheme for banks H1 
2015 
No objection 14/01/2015 
 SA.42080 (2015/N) – Sixth 
prolongation of Cypriot 
Guarantee Scheme for Banks 
H2 2015 
No objection 13/07/2015 
Denmark SA.40029 (2014/N) – 
Reintroduction of the winding-
up scheme, compensation 
scheme, Model I and Model II – 
H1 2015 
No objection 13/02/2015 
 
 SA.42405 (2015/N) 
Prolongation of the Danish 
winding-up scheme, 
compensation scheme, Model I 
and Model II – H2 2015 
No objection 18/09/2015 
France SA.39690 (2015/N) – Extension 
du champ d'activité de SFIL-
CAFFIL au financement des 
crédits à l'exportation 
No objection – no aid 05/05/2015 
Germany SA.40836 (2015/N) 
Amendment to the methodology 
for calculating the aid element 
in guarantees (Germany) 
No objections 27/07/2015 
                                                          
272
 For further information see IP/15/5302 of 2 July 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5302_en.htm 
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Greece SA.40030(2014/N) – 
Prolongation of the Guarantee 
Scheme and Bond Loan Scheme 
for Credit Institutions in Greece 
No objection 14/01/2015 
 HT.4524 – STEC 2015 Communication 26/01/2015 
 SA.41503 (2015/N) – 
Resolution of Panellinia Bank 
through a transfer order to 
Piraeus Bank 
No objection
273
 16/04/2015 
 SA.42215 (2015/N) – 
Prolongation of the Greek 
Financial Support Measure 
No objection 29/06/2015 
 HT.4524 – STEC 2015 Communication 30/06/2015 
 SA.43364 (2015/N) -
Amendment of the restructuring 
plan approved in 2014 and 
granting of new aid to Piraeus 
No objection
274
 29/11/2015 
 SA.43366 (2015/N) -
Amendment of the restructuring 
plan approved in 2014 and 
granting of new aid to Alpha 
Bank 
No objection
275
 26/11/2015 
 SA.43363 (2015/N) – 
Amendment of the restructuring 
plan approved in 2014 and 
granting of new aid to Eurobank 
No objection
276
 26/11/2015 
Ireland SA.39837 (2014/N) – Sixth 
prolongation of the Credit 
Union Resolution Scheme H1 
2015 
No objection 29/01/2015 
 SA.33442 (2011/N) – 
Restructuring of Irish Life & 
Permanent Group Holdings plc 
(PTSB) 
No objection
277
 09/04/2015 
 SA.41371 (2015/N) – First 
prolongation of the Credit 
Union restructuring and 
stabilisation scheme 
No objection 05/05/2015 
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 For further information see IP/15/6193 of 29 November 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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release_IP-15-6184_en.htm 
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 For further information see IP/15/6184 of 26 November 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6184_en.htm 
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 For further information see IP/15/4755 of 9 April 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-4755_en.htm 
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 SA.42083 (2015/N) – Seventh 
prolongation of the Credit 
Union Resolution Scheme H2 
2015 
No objection 02/07/2015 
 SA.43423 (2015/N) - Ireland 
2nd prolongation of the Credit 
Union restructuring and 
stabilisation Scheme 
No objection 16/11/2015 
Italy SA.39451 (2015/C) ex 2015/NN 
– State support to Banca 
TERCAS 
Opening 27/02/2015 
 SA.43547 (2015/N) – Italy 
Resolution of Carichieti 
No objection 22/11/2015 
 SA.41925 (2015/N) – Italy -
Resolution of Carife  
No objection 22/11/2015 
 SA.41134 (2015/N) – Italy - 
Resolution of Banca Etruria  
No objection 22/11/2015 
 SA.39543 (2015/N) – Italy - 
Resolution of Banca Marche  
No objection 22/11/2015 
Latvia SA.36904 (2014/N) – MLB 
development segment & 
creation of the Latvian Single 
Development Institution 
No objection 09/06/2015 
Poland SA.40096 (2014/N) – Second 
prolongation of the Credit 
Unions Orderly Liquidation 
Scheme H1 2015 
No objection 27/01/2015 
 SA.40480 (2015/N) – Eleventh 
prolongation of the Polish Bank 
guarantee scheme – H1 2015 
No objection  27/01/2015 
 SA.37421 (2014/N) – Polish 
Guarantee Methodology 
No objection 01/07/2015 
 SA.42078 (2015/N) – Third 
prolongation of the Credit 
Unions Orderly Liquidation 
Scheme – H2 2015 
No objection 06/07/2015 
 SA.42560 (2015/N) – Poland - 
Twelfth prolongation of the 
Polish bank guarantee scheme 
No Objection 24/08/2015 
Portugal SA.39991 (2014/N) – Eleventh 
Prolongation of the Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme 
No objection 04/02/2015 
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 SA.39958 (2014/N) – Third 
prolongation of the Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme on EIB 
lending 
No objection 06/02/2015 
 SA.42156 (2015/N) – Fourth 
prolongation of the Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme on EIB 
lending 
No objection 15/07/2015 
 SA.42404 (2015/N) – Twelfth 
Prolongation of the PT 
Guarantee Scheme 
No objection 22/07/2015 
 SA.36123 (2013/N) – Banif No objection278 21/12/2015 
United Kingdom SA.38535 (2014/N) – State 
support to the flood  reinsurance 
scheme 
No objection 29/01/2015 
 SA.40188 (2015/N) – UK – 
Green Investment Bank 
No objection 16/11/2015 
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 For further information see IP/15/5439 of 24 July 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-5439_en.htm  
 
